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ARTICLES
JUDICIAL PURPOSE AND THE SCHOLARLY
PROCESS: THE LINCOLN MILLS CASE
JAMES E. PFANDER*
Although the role of the federal judiciary in policing the collective bar-
gaining agreement has been an established feature of our national labor
policy since 1957, the existence of legislative support for that role has
long been doubted. The seeds of doubt were sown by inadequacies in the
Supreme Court's majority opinion in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills.' In holding that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 19472 authorized the federal courts to fashion a body of federal
common law to govern the enforcement of labor contracts, Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas offered little support from the language, structure, or
history of the statute.3 Moreover, by noting that his interpretation re-
solved doubts about the statute's constitutionality,4 Douglas laid himself
open to the claim that the Court itself, rather than the considered policy
choice of Congress, was responsible for introducing substance into an
otherwise jurisdictional statute.
Justice Felix Frankfurter, whose disagreements with Douglas in mat-
ters of style, temperament, and judicial philosophy increasingly divided
the two former friends,5 wasted little time in asserting the claim. In his
* Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A. 1978, University of Mis-
souri-Columbia; J.D. 1982, University of Virginia. Thanks go to Donald Dripps, Laurie Mikva, and
Melvin I. Urofsky for helpful comments and criticism, to Rob Ellis and Jim Piper for research
assistance and to the University of Illinois for research support. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
2. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)). For
the text of the statute, see infra note 32.
3. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957). Douglas appeared
to base his decision largely on the weight of lower court authority. His opinion describes the legisla-
tive record as "cloudy and confusing," id. at 452, and his brief review of the legislative materials was
incomplete and misleading. See infra text accompanying notes 111-17.
4. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
5. Many biographies trace the backgrounds of Frankfurter and Douglas, their formative ex-
periences before they came to the Court, and the increasingly testy personal relations that character-
ized their later years as colleagues. See H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981);
L BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER (1969); L. BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER (1984) [herein-
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famous Lincoln Mills dissent, Frankfurter chastised the majority for hav-
ing read into section 301 an intention on the part of Congress to confer
lawmaking power on the federal courts.6  Frankfurter's own review of
the statute's legislative history had convinced him that although section
301 conferred jurisdiction upon the federal courts, it failed to make labor
contracts binding as a matter of federal law.7 As a consequence, Frank-
furter argued that Congress had intended state law to control the sub-
stantive enforcement of labor contracts.8  This conclusion led
Frankfurter to consider the constitutional question that the majority's
after BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER]; H. THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE
BENCH (1960); W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939-1975 (1980) [hereinafter W. DOUGLAS,
THE COURT YEARS]; W. DOUGLAS, THE DOUGLAS LETTERS (M. Urofsky ed. 1987) [hereinafter W.
DOUGLAS, THE DOUGLAS LETTERS]; J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM
0. DOUGLAS (1980); Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas
and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J.
71. The biographers generally agree, however, that the two men commenced their work on the
Court together as friends. Both shared an abiding respect for Justice Louis Brandeis, both had
taught before their appointment to the Court, Frankfurter at Harvard, Douglas at Yale, and both
came to Washington, D.C. as committed supporters of Roosevelt's New Deal. For accounts of the
role of Frankfurter and Douglas in the New Deal, see BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER, supra, at
275-318; L. BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER, supra, at 145-210; W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG
MAN 257-376 (1974). For accounts of Douglas's early respect for Frankfurter, see Urofsky, supra,
at 73-76 and W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 329 (1974) (Frankfurter and Douglas were
close friends in 1939). For his part, Frankfurter approved of Douglas's appointment to the bench,
regarding him as a man "who is historic-minded about the law, but also knows that history is not a
tale of dead things but part of a dynamic process." BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER, supra, at 420.
6. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 460-62 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also infra text ac-
companying notes 118-21.
7. Justice Frankfurter's only detailed review of the language and history of section 301 ap-
peared in his plurality opinion in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). a discussion he later incorporated into his Lincoln Mills dissent.
See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 462.
In Westinghouse, its first brush with section 301, the Court held, over Douglas's dissent, that the
jurisdictional language of the statute did not embrace an action brought by a union to recover sala-
ries allegedly owed to its members under a collective bargaining agreement. See Westinghouse, 348
U.S. at 459-460. Although Frankfurter based his decision on the assertion that the individual rights
at issue in the case were not properly vindicated in an action brought under section 301, his opinion
for three members of the Court warned of future difficulties by raising doubts as to the constitution-
ality of legislation that transferred litigation of claims governed by state law to a federal forum. Id.
at 448-52. Those doubts were laid to rest in Lincoln Mills, in which the Court held that section 301
was intended to authorize the federal courts to fashion substantive law to govern labor contracts.
Westinghouse was subsequently overruled. See United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 700 (1966). Rights established in a collective agreement may now be vindicated in an
action brought either by the union or by an individual employee, see Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,
371 U.S. 195, 199 (1962), so long as the plaintiff first exhausts arbitral remedies if any under the
agreement. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657 (1965).
8. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 462.
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approach had avoided. 9 He concluded that, because it empowered the
federal courts to hear actions that did not arise under the laws of the
United States, section 301 exceeded the scope of judicial power under
article III, section 2 of the Constitution."
In a practical sense, the debate between Douglas and Frankfurter over
the role of the federal courts in regulating compliance with labor con-
tracts has lost much of its currency.lI In the thirty-three years that have
passed since Lincoln Mills, the Court has built up a vast body of federal
common law that defines the duty to comply with collective bargaining
agreements, 2 a body of law that was aptly described by one observer as a
"remarkable exercise in judicial creativity."1 3 Thus, the Court's own ac-
ceptance of its role as the arbiter of labor policy under section 301, cou-
pled with legislative acquiescence in that role,14 has meant that labor and
management measure their contract obligations according to legal rules
set down by the federal courts, in keeping with the lawmaking function
that Douglas envisioned.
In a larger sense, however, the Douglas-Frankfurter debate continues.
Doubts raised by Douglas's discursive opinion and Frankfurter's pointed
attack continue to inform the attitudes of legal scholars toward the legiti-
macy of the Court's formulation of federal common law under section
301. Those who commented upon Lincoln Mills at the time it came
down generally agreed with Frankfurter that the 80th Congress had
9. Id. at 469.
10. Id. at 484.
11. As Justice Brennan explained in 1981, "[I]t is far too late in the day to deny that Congress
intended the federal courts to enjoy wide-ranging authority to enforce labor contracts under § 301."
Umted Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 627 (1981).
12. Section 301 has spawned both an immense outpouring of opinions and a flood of commen-
tary. For a careful review of the evolution of the Court's section 301 jurisprudence, see Feller, A
General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. RFv. 663 (1973). For com-
ments on the Court's controversial decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970), which held that the federal courts may enjoin strikes in breach of contract, see
Vladeck, Boys Markets and National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1970); Gould, On Labor
Injunctions, Unions, and the Judger The Boys Markets Case, 1970 Sup. Cr. REv. 215; Klare, The
Public, Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358, 1415 (1982).
13. See Feller, supra note 12, at 718.
14. Since section 301 was enacted in 1947, Congress has neither amended its provisions nor
taken any substantial steps towards overruling any of the Court's section 301 decisions. Thus, the
effort to overrule Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), had stalled long before the
Court reversed itself-a fact Justice Black bitterly noted in dissent. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 259 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). Of course, legislative
acquiescence may reflect more a stalemate in Congress between labor and management than univer-
sal acclaim for the Court's decisions.
1991]
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failed to specify that it meant the federal courts to apply federal law to
the collective labor agreement.15 The prevailing view of Lincoln Mills
was best captured by a respected labor law scholar who opined that it
was unlikely that "so much has ever been read into so little before by the
Supreme Court." 16 In recent years, leading texts17 and law review arti-
cles"8 have continued to treat the judicial role under section 301 as one
that Douglas conferred upon the Court by fiat rather than one he discov-
ered in the statute.19
This Article revisits the debate between Douglas and Frankfurter with
a view towards assessing the merits of the two Justices' competing inter-
pretations of section 301.20 Part I traces the origins of the Taft-Hartley
15. In the leading critique of Lincoln Mills, Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington described
the opinion as having disposed of difficult questions of statutory construction, of federalism, and of
judicial power "in [an] assertive fashion with little apparent consideration of their implications. The
disposition was virtually without 'opinion,' if by opinion we mean rationally articulated grounds of
decision." Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6 (1957). See also Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57
MICH. L. REv. 635, 641 (1959) ("Justice Douglas did not offer much explanatory legal theory. He
saw where he wanted to go and knew he would get there if he could get the votes of four of his
colleagues.").
16. C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE'LAW 471 (2d ed. 1958). Professor Gregory's assessment of
section 301 changed markedly over the years, apparently in response to Frankfurter's dissent in
Lincoln Mills. For a more complete account, see infra note 277.
17. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 110 (4th ed. 1983) (section 301 grants
jurisdiction over suits on labor contracts but does not set out any federal rules of decision; Lincoln
Mills reads the statute as requiring the federal courts to fashion and apply federal common law); M.
SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE 127 (1964) (in Lincoln Mills, the Court "established itself as the overseer... of a whole
new body of law."); R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES--COM-
MENTS--QUESTIONS 823 (4th ed. 1987) (describing the decision as holding that the "purposes of the
Taft-Hartley Act demanded a federal judge-made law respecting the enforcement of collective-bar-
gaining agreements although the statute spoke only of jurisdiction").
18. Discussions of the power of federal courts to fashion federal common law frequently pro-
ceed on the assumption that the Court derived the lawmaking power recognized in Lincoln Mills
from a grant of jurisdiction, rather than from direction by Congress. See, e.g., Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383,412 (1964) ("by granting the
federal courts jurisdiction over suits .... Congress gave a mandate to federal judges to fashion a body
of contract law"); Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV.
881, 941 (1986) (directive to fashion federal common law derived from a grant of jurisdiction and a
bit of legislative history).
19. For a summary of the labor bar's reaction to Lincoln Mills, see infra notes 128-141.
20. Recently, the business of statutory interpretation has again become the subject of much
debate. The 1980s witnessed the rise of a "new textualism"-a renewed call for primary reliance in
the interpretive process on the language and structure of the statute. Identified most closely with
Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook, the new textualism has again raised time-
honored questions about whether courts can effectively, or constitutionally, rely on debates and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/12
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Act and the likely attitudes of Douglas and Frankfurter towards legisla-
tion that was meant to curtail the power of trade unions by giving federal
courts a larger role in policing industrial conflict.21 I show that Frank-
furter was deeply committed to the notion that federal courts were insti-
committee reports in attempting to say what a statute means. See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 60 (1984);
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983). See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a critical summary of what he perceives as
too rigid a return to statutory texts, see Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621
(1990).
At the same time conservative jurists have called for renewed emphasis on the text of statutes,
critical scholars have increasingly argued that all legal texts, including those that make up federal
statutes, lack a definitive meaning. Rather, the process of reading statutes requires the reader to
interact with the text, and thus injects the reader's own language and system of values into the
interpretive process. This focus on the interpretive process has produced an outpouring of writing
on law and literature, much of which can be traced to the early work of Stanley Fish. See S. FISH,
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) (collecting Fish's earlier work). For a sampling, see INTER-
PRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux eds.
1988). Cf. R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988) (literature
has but few lessons to teach a judiciary that must interpret statutes); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpreta-
tion, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra, at 229, 248-49 (arguing against what he
perceives as the nihilism of interpretive indeterminancy as applied to legal texts).
Even if one adopts the view that most courts and most scholars will consult statutory texts and
legislative history in most difficult cases, and thus places to one side the disagreement about whether
the text of the statute provides the sole and definitive, or an inherently uncertain, guide to legislative
meaning, much remains in dispute. At the center of the debate over statutory interpretation, one
finds disagreement on the extent to which one or more "dynamic" theories of statutory interpreta-
tion may be utilized to fill in holes, or more aggressively update, legislative enactments. For a sum-
mary of views, see Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179 (1986); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987); Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 281 (1989). Most of these works address the implications of the widely accepted notion
that courts are subordinate to legislatures, that they must give effect to the language of the statute
that Congress drafted. Part of the debate centers on the issue of time: to what extent must the
apparent intention of legislatures guide the courts when the passage of time presents society, and the
courts, with a problem different from that the legislature faced.
Much of this important debate lacks immediate relevance to the problem presented by the Lincoln
Mills case. Although they reached different results, Justices Douglas and Frankfurter both insulted
the statute's language, structure, and history in deciding how to interpret section 301. In this Arti-
cle, I follow the lead of the Justices; I assume that the precepts of, and limits on, interpretation are
essentially those that Frankfurter set forth in his work on the subject. See Frankfurter, Some Reflec-
tions on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947). I conclude that Frankfurter attrib-
uted a meaning to section 301 quite out of line with what he would otherwise have considered a
disinterested review of the statute's history and did so for the purpose of forcing congressional recon-
sideration of the decision to vest contract enforcement duties in the federal courts. He thus violated
his own admonition that judicial antipathy to the legislative design does not excuse the "eviscera-
tion" of statutes. Id. at 533.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 35-106.
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tutionally unfit to play such a role.22 Next, I review in greater detail the
opinions in the Lincoln Mills case and their reception by labor law schol-
ars, who largely accepted the central claim of Frankfurter's dissent:
Congress intended section 301 to solve the procedural problems that em-
ployers experienced in attempting to enforce the collective bargain in
state court and merely to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear
such claims.23
In Part II of the Article, I conduct a review of the language, structure,
and history of the statute.2" In sharp contrast to the conventional wis-
dom, such a review discloses an array of evidence supporting Douglas's
conclusion that section 301 not only established a federal substantive
right to contract enforcement, but also authorized the federal courts to
fashion rules to govern actions to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments on a case-by-case basis. I begin by reviewing the state court en-
forcement difficulties that led to the statute's passage. I show that most
state courts enforced the collective contract, if at all, by relying on the
individual contract of hire between employees and the firm.25 Section
301 addresses the resulting enforcement difficulties by transforming the
contract enforcement action from a suit brought to vindicate individual
rights into an action to enforce collective or group interests; the statute
made both unions and employers responsible for their labor contracts on
a collective or entity basis. These substantive changes in labor contract
enforcement theory belie any claim that section 301 incorporated state
law; indeed, the debates and committee reports assume that violations of
labor contracts would present a federal question.26 Such was the position
of the principal sponsor and draftsman of the statute, Senator Robert
Taft, who defended section 301 from the precise constitutional attack
that Frankfurter later mounted on the statute by expressly rejecting the
claim that section 301 contemplated reference to state substantive law.27
While this evidence suggests that the judicial power recognized in Lin-
coln Mills rests on more than the historical accident that Justice Douglas
had five votes for his reading of section 301, it raises more complex ques-
tions. In view of the statute's substantive content, it appears difficult to
22. See infra text accompanying notes 89-98.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 107-41.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 142-265.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 150-80.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 226-44.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 245-49.
[Vol. 69:243
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understand why Douglas failed to offer more cogent support for his inter-
pretation of the statute, why Frankfurter was moved to attack section
30 I's constitutionality, and why the legitimacy of the judicial role the
statute envisioned has been so widely questioned. This Article addresses
these questions in Part III."8 It concludes that the conventional under-
standing of section 301 rests on a conviction, shared by Frankfurter and
many students of industrial relations, that the courts should stay out of
industrial relations.
I. LINCOLN MILLS: THE BACKGROUND, THE BRETHREN,
AND THE BAR'S REACTION
A. Lincoln Mills: The Problem
Lincoln Mills came to the Supreme Court as a relatively straightfor-
ward dispute between labor and management over the enforcement of a
collective bargaining agreement. After organizing a plant in Huntsville,
Alabama, the Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, entered into a
one-year agreement with Lincoln Mills that, like the vast majority of
such contracts today,29 prohibited strikes by the union during the life of
the contract and established a grievance procedure for the resolution of
disputes over the administration of the contract.3 0 In keeping with the
procedure, the union filed a number of work assignment grievances and
demanded binding arbitration. When the employer refused, the union
brought suit under section 301 to compel the employer to submit the
grievances to arbitration. On its facts, therefore, Lincoln Mills required
the Court to decide whether section 301 empowered the district court to
order the employer to proceed to arbitration under a labor contract.31
The language of section 301 addresses the enforcement of arbitration
agreements in general terms only. It provides that suits for violation of
28. See infra text accompanying notes 266-89.
29. Approximately 98% of the collective bargaining agreements in force in 1989 provided for
grievance arbitration. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS: BASIC
PATrERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 51:5 (BNA) (1989).
30. This account of the facts of Lincoln Mills was taken from the opinion of the lower court.
See Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
31. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449. Apart from constitutional doubts that Frankfurter
raised two years earlier in Westinghouse, see supra note 7, the issue was complicated by the common
law's refusal to enforce executory arbitration agreements, by the uncertain reach of federal legisla-
tion that vitiated the common law rule, and by the possible application of Norris-LaGuardia's bar to
injunctive relief. See infra notes 113-14.
1991]
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contracts between employers and labor organizations may be brought in
federal court without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizen-
ship of the parties.32  While this language is broad enough to vest the
federal courts with jurisdiction to hear disputes over the employer's al-
leged breach of its labor contract, it does not specifically declare that the
parties must comply with their collective bargaining agreements or their
arbitration agreements. Moreover, the statute does not specify that fed-
eral courts may order the specific performance of such agreements. The
answer to the question posed in Lincoln Mills thus drove Justice Douglas
and Justice Frankfurter to interpret the language of the statute in light of
its legislative history; it pushed them, in Frankfurter's words, to under-
take the troublesome task of determining "the extent to which extrane-
ous documentation and external circumstances may be allowed to
infiltrate the text [of the statute] on the theory that they were part of it,
written in ink discernible to the judicial eye."33 In this Article, I focus on
the manner in which Justices Douglas and Frankfurter discharged their
interpretive task in Lincoln Mills. I proceed on the unremarkable as-
sumption that the values of the two Justices may have "infiltrated the
32. Section 301 reads as follows:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States havingjurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined
in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue
or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of
the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of
the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against
its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations in the
district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a
labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal
office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in
representing or acting for employee members.
(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of any court of the United
States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capacity as such, shall consti.
tute service upon the labor organization.
(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as an
"agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the
question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently
ratified shall not be controlling.
Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)).
33. Frankfurter, supra note 20, at 529.
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text" of section 301.11 Before taking up the opinions in Lincoln Mills,
their use of the legislative history, and their reception by the labor bar, I
review the bitter post-war debate over the alleged abuse of trade union
power that led to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. I also
explore the likely attitudes of the two Justices to legislation that vested
the federal courts with enlarged responsibility for the administration of
laws that were evidently aimed at curtailing union power.
B. The Origins of Taft-Hartley
As early as 1915, the noted labor economist John R. Commons pre-
dicted that governmental recognition of the right of employees to form
unions and to bargain collectively with their employers would necessarily
entail government regulation of the internal affairs of trade unions.35
The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 194736 was the first step towards
34. Since Holmes, lawyers have agreed that the experiences, biases, and predilections of judges
inform the content of their legal decisions. Many go beyond Holmes in asserting that legal texts are
essentially indeterminant legal vessels into which judges pour content. See supra note 20. Although
Frankfurter, a great champion of judicial restraint, would not have accepted such a proposition as a
normative matter, he certainly understood that statutory interpretation gives judges "considerable"
room to maneuver. Frankfurter, supra note 20, at 533. Frankfurter believed, however, that institu-
tional constraints placed on the judicial function in ascertaining the meaning of statutory language
could prevent judges from transgressing the boundary between interpretation and legislation. Id.
35. A former union member, Commons founded the so-called Wisconsin School of Institutional
Economics, which attributed the success of organized labor in this country to its emphasis on "vol-
untarism" or job-conscious unionism. See 4 J. COMMONS, D. SAPOSS, H. SUMNER, E. MITrLEMAN,
H HOAGLAND, J. ANDREWS & S. PERLMAN, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 621-26
(1936). For critiques of the Wisconsin School's denial of class consciousness among the working
class, see J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 156-59 (1983);
Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1119 n.17
(1989).
Commons has been credited with the comment referred to in the text, which appears in the final
report of the Commission on Industrial Relations:
It doubtless has appealed to some people who consider the employer's position more pow-
erful than that of the union, that the employer should be compelled in some way to deal
with unions, or at least to confer with their representatives. But if the State recognizes any
particular union by requiring the employer to recognize it, the State must necessarily guar-
antee the union to the extent that it must strip it of any abuses it may practice.
Fleming, The Significance of the Wagner Act, in LABOR AND THE NEW DEAL 121, 138 (M. Derber
& E. Young eds. 1957) (quoting U.S. Comm'n on Industrial Relations, Final Report 374 (1915)).
36. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 61 Stat. 156 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1982)). On the origins of Taft-Hartley, see H. MILLIS & E.
BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY (1950); C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE
UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-
1960 (1985); H. HARRIS, THE RIGHT TO MANAGE: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS POLICIES OF AMERI-
CAN BUSINESS IN THE 1940s (1982); J. SEIDMAN, AMERICAN LABOR FROM DEFENSE TO RECON-
VERSION (1953). For useful summaries of the provisions of Taft-Hartley, see H. MILLIS & E.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the vindication of Commons' prediction. 37  Taft-Hartley reflected the
view that, having established a national policy encouraging the institu-
tion of collective bargaining, the federal government was obliged to regu-
late the trade unions that carried the policy into effect. Thus, Taft-
Hartley was both an outgrowth of, and a reaction to, the Wagner Act of
1935 3 8-New Deal legislation that, for the first time, established a regime
of compulsory collective bargaining in the private sector.39
More than the mere refinement of the existing regulatory scheme,
Taft-Hartley was the culmination of a partisan4 drive to reduce the
BROWN, supra, at 395-610; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
HARv. L. REV. 274 (1948).
37. The second step was taken with the passage of the Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982))
(LMRDA). Unlike Taft-Hartley, which focused on the relations between unions and employees, the
LMRDA specifically regulates the relationship between unions and their members. While in prac-
tice the two categories often overlap-statutory employees under Taft-Hartley often join the union
they have chosen as their bargaining representative, and thus become members for purposes of the
LMRDA-the thrust of the two statutes differs. The LMRDA regulates the internal disciplinary
process of unions, the election of union officers, and the imposition of trusteeships by parent unions
on their subordinate local unions-matters that Taft-Hartley left to state law. See generally M.
MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION (1988); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions
Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REv. 819 (1960).
38. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982)).
39. Congress had taken a number of partial steps towards a policy of support for collective
bargaining prior to the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935. The Railway Labor Act of 1926 imposed
a statutory duty on both sides to make every "reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions." 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982)). Likewise, the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 198 (1933),
§ 7(a), sought to persuade employers to recognize and bargain with unions of their employees'
choosing. But the statute, which was declared unconstitutional in 1935, see A.L.A. Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), lacked adequate enforcement procedures and was
largely undermined by employer recalcitrance. See generally H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note
36, at 22-26.
40. In the minds of the American public, organized labor and the Wagner Act were closely
associated with the Democratic party, Franklin Roosevelt, and the New Deal. The decisive rejection
of the Democrats in the mid-term congressional elections of 1946-the GOP captured both Houses
of Congress for the first time in 14 years-was thus interpreted by many as a call for reform of the
nation's labor laws, a "mandate for change." See R. LEE, TRUMAN AND TAFr-HARTLEY; A QuES-
TION OF MANDATE 15-18, 31-45 (1966); S. HARTMANN, TRUMAN AND THE 80TH CONGRESS 7-11
(1971). See also J. PATTERSON, MR. REPUBLICAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT A. TAFT 352-353
(1972). The movement to adopt labor legislation in 1947 thus reflected partisan division, fueled in
no small part by organized labor's well-known financial support for FDR and liberal New Deal
Democrats. See C. TOMLINS, supra note 36, at 248. But the success of the Republican effort to
reform the nation's labor laws also depended on attracting the support of conservative Democrats
from the South and West. Twenty Democrats, 17 from the South, two from Maryland and one from
New Mexico, joined 48 Republicans in the Senate's crucial vote to override Truman's veto of Taft-
Hartley. See S. HARTMANN, supra, at 90.
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power of organized labor under the Wagner Act.41 After the Supreme
Court rejected an initial challenge to the statute's constitutionality, con-
servative business groups lobbied Congress either to repeal the Wagner
Act or, failing that, to add a series of provisions that would regulate
unions directly and restore "balance" to what they viewed as the statute's
pro-labor tilt.42 While this effort made some headway during the war
years,4" it was aided considerably after the hostilities ended by a variety
of factors that pushed public opinion on the labor question sharply to the
right.' To begin with, organized labor conducted a record-breaking
number of strikes during the reconversion years of 1946 and 1947 that
41. Many commentators have noted features of the Taft-Hartley Act that were more obviously
aimed at reducing the power of organized labor than at addressing the union abuses that Senator
Robert Taft and others cited in arguing for reform legislation. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at
268; H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 274.
42. Many scholars have traced the increasing sophistication of conservative business lobbying
groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM),
and the significant, if not decisive, role they played in generating public support for Taft-Hartley.
See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 281-91; H. HARRIS, supra note 36, at 109-25. Those
efforts began in the months following the passage of the Wagner Act, which NAM not only de-
scribed as unconstitutional but encouraged its members to challenge in court. See Wilcock, Indus-
trial Management's Policies Toward Unionism, in LABOR AND THE NEW DEAL 275, 292 (M. Derber
& E. Young eds. 1957); H. HARRIS, supra note 36, at 23-25. Following the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), which upheld the statute's consti-
tutionality, NAM called for amendments to the "one-sided" Wagner Act. See H. MILLIS & E.
BROWN, supra note 36, at 284; H. HARRIS, supra note 36, at 120-23. In arguing for balancing
legislation, NAM emphasized that the Wagner Act prohibited employers from interfering with the
right of employees to form, assist, and join labor organizations but failed to recognize an employee's
right to refrain from union membership or to prohibit unions from interfering with such a right. Id.
at 121. NAM declined to emphasize that these "one-sided" provisions had been included in the
Wagner Act by design, essentially on the theory that pro-labor legislation was needed to achieve
balance in the bargaining power of employers and workers. See, eg., Fleming, supra note 35, at 138-
41.
43. Labor's success in staving off amendments to the Wagner Act owed much to the work of
the La Follette Committee on Industrial Espionage, which discovered widespread evidence that em-
ployer groups had used spies and propaganda to discredit organized labor. See H. MILLIS & E.
BROWN, supra note 36, at 100-01, 283-85.
Two significant legislative developments occurred during World War II. First, Congress passed
the Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes Act over President Roosevelt's veto-a statute that regu-
lated labor's use of the strike weapon for the duration of the hostilities. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN,
supra note 36, at 354-56. Second, Congress passed a series of appropriations bills that reflected the
legislature's increasing disenchantment with the alleged bias of the National Labor Relations Board.
Id. at 51.
44. The clearest evidence of this rightward swing was the passage by both chambers of the Case
bill in 1946, legislation that died when Congress failed to override Truman's veto. See H. MILLIS &
E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 36-62. In addition, restrictive labor legislation made a good deal of
progress in state legislatures during the right-to-work drive of the 1940s. See id. at 322-32.
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inconvenienced many consumers and contributed to the perception that
labor not only possessed monopoly power but used it irresponsibly.45 La-
bor did little to combat this perception;4 6 indeed, its failure to take volun-
tary steps to resolve jurisdictional disputes and other internal problems
lent support to the claim that union abuses required a legislative solu-
tion.47 Coupled with the Republican victories in the 1946 elections,
45. The reconversion strikes undoubtedly contributed to the public's demand for restrictive
labor legislation. Although organized labor had largely honored its no-strike pledge during World
War II, the end of hostilities and the demise of wage-price controls triggered inflationary pressures
that reduced the real purchasing power of wages. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 232-48; H.
MILLIS & E. BRowN, supra note 36, at 298-306. To combat this erosion, labor again resorted to the
strike weapon. Whether measured in terms of working days lost (116 million), number of workers
involved (4,600,000) or actual number (4,985), 1946 was a record-breaking year for strikes. See H.
MLLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 300-02; J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 244. Partly as a result
of President Truman's restrictive efforts to end the strike in the railroad industry and partly because
of the highhanded tactics of John Lewis in the coal fields, see J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 235-38,
241-44, the public largely blamed unions for these strikes, rather than the intransigence of employ-
ers. Business groups, needless to say, encouraged the allocation of blame to unions. See supra note
42.
46. Unions certainly recognized the anti-union elements of the proposed law and argued vigor-
ously against the legislation on that basis. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 268 (quoting AFL's
assertion that the legislation was "conceived in vindictiveness against unions, rejection of collective
bargaining and the principle of equality between employer and union"); C. TOMLINS, supra note 36,
at 250 (quoting CIO president Philip Murray's characterization of Taft-Hartley as the "creature of
the reactionary arm of big business"). But the unions were curiously ineffective in marshalling pub-
lic support for their position. They essentially sat out the 1946 elections, see S. HARTMANN, supra
note 40, at 6, and they flatly refused to accept any legislation that would limit jurisdictional disputes
and secondary boycotts, despite the wide range ofsupport in Congress for such reforms. Frustration
with the unions' unbending opposition to reform undoubtedly contributed to the drive for legisla-
tion. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 254-55.
47. By early 1947, there was widespread support for the passage of legislation to end certain
union "abuses," chief among them jurisdictional, rival union, and work-assignment disputes. Such
disputes, which inevitably arise as competing unions seek to represent a single group of employees or
to perform a particular task, had become increasingly common following the rift between the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. See W. GALENSON, THE
CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 1935-41
(1960). Such disputes were widely viewed as unfairly exposing the employer, and the public, to
competing union demands that could not be resolved; President Truman, for example, listed jurisdic-
tional disputes as the first item on the rather limited agenda for labor reform legislation that he
proposed in his State of the Union address, see 92 CONG. REc. 136 (1947), and the liberal Republi-
can Senator from Oregon, Wayne Morse, who supported some reform legislation but ultimately
opposed Taft-Hartley as anti-union, introduced legislation to address jurisdictional disputes. See 93
CONG. REc. 1890 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, 951-52 (1959) (compiling statistics on rival union disputes from 1935-
46) (hereinafter LEGIS. HIST.).
Despite bipartisan support for legislation to cure the jurisdictional dispute, organized labor was
completely inflexible in its opposition to any change in the law. Thus, while the presidents of both
federations agreed in their testimony before Congress that such disputes were unfortunate, they
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which established a GOP majority in both houses of Congress for the
first time since the New Deal,4" these factors made reform of the nation's
labor law the leading item on the legislative agenda when the 80th Con-
gress convened in January 1947.19
The prevailing attitude in Congress was articulated by Robert Al-
phonso Taft,50 the Republican Senator from Ohio and the man largely
responsible for the final content of the legislation that bears his name.51
Although Taft was philosophically opposed to much of the New Deal
and probably to the Wagner Act's support for collective bargaining,52 he
failed to identify any effective internal means for their resolution. See C. TOMLINS, supra note 36, at
308-09. The House committe report on the proposed legislation commented trenchantly on this
failure: "Union leaders themselves acknowledge the evils of most of these practices... but they
have failed to provide effective remedies.... This the bill does." H. REP. No. 245 on H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIST., supra, at 315.
For a discussion of the public's increasing impatience with other union practices, such as racial
discrimination, the charging of excessive dues, and racketeering, see H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra
note 36, at 279-80.
48. See supra note 40.
49. For the first six months of 1947, the labor question dominated debate in Congress and the
country. On the first day of the session, some seventeen bills dealing with labor policy were intro-
duced in the House; within two weeks, the number exceeded 100. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at
262.
50. Elected to his first term in 1938 after a distinguished career as a student at Harvard Law
School and a stint in state politics in Ohio, Taft was eager for the task. He had been a consistent
opponent of big government whose calls to roll back New Deal reforms had long gone unheeded. J.
PATrERSON, supra note 40, at 44-45, 90-105, 335-37. Harboring presidential aspirations that he
announced officially in October, Taft understood that the opportunity to shape labor reform legisla-
tion would provide him with nationwide press coverage and a chance to demonstrate presidential
leadership skills. Taft therefore convinced the ranking Republican member of the Senate labor com-
mittee to step aside, took over the chairmanship of the committee, and promptly convened hearings
on an array of bills to reform the Wagner Act. See S. HARTMANN, supra note 40, at 15-16.
51. Most scholars agree that Senator Taft played a decisive role in controlling the final content
of Taft-Hartley. See C. TOMLINS, supra note 36, at 275-79; S. HARTMANN, supra note 40, at 85-86.
He was certainly well placed to do so. In addition to his chairmanship of the Senate Labor Commit-
tee, Taft was head of the Republican policy committee and the de facto Senate majority leader. See
J. PATTERSON, supra note 40, at 335.
Despite these obvious advantages, Taft did not completely control the Senate labor committee's
deliberative process. On a number of issues, liberal Republican Senators Ives and Morse joined
Democrats in rejecting proposals to limit the power of trade unions. But Taft eventually prevailed.
After appending a minority report that articulated his views and those of other hard-line Republi-
cans, see SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS ON S. 1126, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-56, reprinted
in I LEGIS. Hisr., supra note 47, at 456-62, Taft led the floor fight that resulted in the Senate's
adopting many of the provisions rejected by the committee. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note
36, at 378-79; S. HARTMANN, supra note 40, at 84-85. The final Senate bill and the conference
agreement thus bore Taft's more restrictive imprint.
52. Taft's instinctive support for the rights of individuals, his concern for the plight of small
business, and his adamant opposition to government regulation suggest that he would have preferred
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did not openly display antipathy to trade unions or to collective bargain-
ing in connection with his work on Taft-Hartley. Rather, he portrayed
the proposed legislation as a corrective measure that would retain the
Wagner Act's sound commitment to collective bargaining53 and would
preserve the right of union members to strike for better wages.5 4 What
was needed, according to Taft, were provisions that would make unions
responsible partners in the collective bargaining process.55 The current
legislative scheme frustrated such equality of responsibility, both because
of the failure of the "one-sided" Wagner Act to regulate unions di-
rectly, 6 and because the Labor Board had adopted biased interpretations
repeal of the Wagner Act to the extension of government involvement in industrial relations. See J.
PATrERSON, supra note 40, at 329-34; C. TOMLINS, supra note 36, at 276-78. A good many conserv-
atives also supported repeal and criticized Taft for promoting amendatory legislation that accepted
the Wagner Act model of collective bargaining. See id. at 280 (quoting critics who attacked Taft-
Hartley for its acceptance of "what was centrally unsound in the original law"). But as Tomlins has
shown in his important study of the Taft-Hartley changes, the basic pattern of federal collective
bargaining policy was too ingrained by 1947 to yield to wholesale revision. Id. at 281.
53. Taft's support for free collective bargaining was emphasized in the Senate labor committee's
report on the proposed bill, see S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1 LEoIS. HIST.,
supra note 47, at 408, as well as in statements he made during the debates.
54. Taft's support for the right of employees to strike was apparently quite deeply and consist-
ently held. Taft had opposed legislation, proposed by President Truman, that would have granted
the federal government sweeping emergency powers to deal with strikes in important industries. See
J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 235-37. In this respect, Taft's views paralleled those of his father,
William Howard Taft, who was no friend of organized labor but defended labor's right to combine
and to persuade others to honor its picket lines. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent.
Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209-10 (1921) (Taft, C.J.).
55. Taft's argument for greater union responsibility within the existing framework of collective
bargaining comes through quite clearly in the report of the Senate labor committee that he chaired in
1947. Thus, the report expresses the view that a fair and equitable labor policy "can best be achieved
by equalizing existing laws in a manner which will encourage free collective bargaining." S. REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1 LEGiS. HiS., supra note 47, at 408. Such equalizing
was necessary, according to the Senate report, as a result of legal developments that placed union
activities beyond the reach of federal laws, "no matter how destructive to the rights of the individual
workers and employers who are conforming to the [Wagner Act]." Id.
56. The critique of the "one-sided" Wagner Act by no means originated with Taft, see supra
note 42, but Taft picked up that theme in the Senate report and translated it into concrete statutory
provisions. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in I LEGis. HisT., supra note 47,
at 408 (attributing excessive power of unions to the "one-sided character of the [Wagner] act itself").
Thus, a variety of provisions were added to the Wagner Act that were explained as balancing amend-
ments designed to establish equal rights and responsibilities between labor and management. In
addition to its new guarantee of employees' right to refrain from union activities, see 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1982), Taft-Hartley added unfair labor practice provisions that forbade unions from restraining
employees in the exercise of such rights and imposed on unions a duty to bargain in good faith.
Each provision resembled existing employer unfair labor practices.
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of the Act.57
Although Taft's call for greater union responsibility within the existing
statutory framework enjoyed the support of Republicans and conserva-
tive Democrats,5" the proposed reforms attracted the vehement and
unanimous opposition of organized labor.5 9 When the bill became law,
labor immediately denounced Taft-Hartley as "slave-labor" legislation'
and launched a vigorous political campaign to obtain its repeal that cost
many legislators their jobs.6 Labor's hostility reflected the fact that, de-
57. Senator Taft and the other supporters of labor reform in Congress repeatedly attacked the
Labor Board for what they considered its biased interpretation of the Wagner Act. Thus, Taft's
Senate committee report chides the Board for its "reputation for partisanship," and proposes an
array of procedural reforms, eventually adopted, that reorganized the Board to separate its
prosecutorial from its judicial function. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1
LEGis. HisT., supra note 47, at 408 ("reputation for partisanship"); id. at 8-10, 1 LEGIS. HisT., supra
note 47, at 414-16 (reorganization of the Labor Board). In addition, Taft-Hartley was at pains to
reverse Labor Board decisions that had extended the protections of the Act to low-level supervisors
and eroded management's so-called free speech rights. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36,
at 399-400, 422-25.
Again, this critique of the Labor Board was not original with Taft but had grown throughout the
1940s. See id. at 49-53, 66-75. While the conservative attack produced changes in the Board's
administration of the Act, before Taft-Hartley was enacted, see J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 262-
63, these did little to mollify congressional critics. See C. ToMLINS, supra note 36, at 271-75.
58. Taft controlled the center of the debate over trade union power and won support from
many legislators, who agreed that changes in the law were necessary to end "abusive" union prac-
tices but were reluctant to reverse the national policy of support for collective bargaining. Taft's
success was in good measure the result of Truman's decision to surrender the field to him. See S.
HARTMANN, supra note 40, at 80-82.
59. In testimony before the House and Senate labor committees, Philip Murray and William
Green, the presidents of the CIO and the AFL, flatly condemned as anti-union virtually every
change in the nation's labor law that had been proposed. See 3 Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act: Hearings Before the House Committee on Labor and Education, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
1630-1738 (1947) (statement of William Green in opposition to proposed restrictions on union secur-
ity, secondary boycotts, jurisdictional disputes and to such limits on the right to strike as cooling-off
periods and compulsory arbitration); C. ToMLINS, supra note 36, at 250 (quoting Murray's descrip-
tion of the legislation as the creature of the reactionary arm of big business). When it became clear
that restrictive legislation was nonetheless destined to emerge from Congress, organized labor sought
to bring political pressure to bear to block its passage. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 264-65.
60. Labor frequently used the rhetoric of involuntary servitude to attack proposed legislation
that imposed limits on the right to strike. In labelling Taft-Hartley a slave-labor bill, the AFL
repeated the attack it had made on the Case bill a year earlier. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at
257, 268.
61. Embattled following the passage of Taft-Hartley, unions were exceedingly active in the
1948 elections and relatively successful. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 653. In an
election in which the Democratic party made the new law a leading issue by pledging its repeal,
voters sent Democratic majorities to both chambers of Congress and chose Truman over Dewey for
the presidency. Id. at 610. While the promised repeal never materialized, organized labor had
demonstrated an ability to reward its friends and punish its enemies at the polls; among the most
Washington University Open Scholarship
258 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:243
spite the statute's continuing, albeit qualified, commitment to the institu-
tion of collective bargaining, Taft-Hartley contains a variety of
provisions that can be better explained as an attack on the political and
economic power of trade unions than as an attempt to foster responsible
collective bargaining.6 2 There was, in short, some justification for organ-
ized labor's contention that the call for greater union responsibility was
but a thin disguise for legislation of a fundamentally anti-union
character.63
Like much of Taft-Hartley, section 301 sought to ensure union respon-
sibility in the collective bargaining process. 64 After studying the question
noteworthy legislative casualties was Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota, a vigorous supporter of
restrictive legislation whose seat was taken by Hubert Humphrey.
62. The most dramatic restriction on the political activity of trade unions appeared in § 304,
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1982)), which prohibited union contributions to, as well
as expenditures on, political campaigns involving elections to Congress or the presidency. This pro-
vision, which both continued and extended the prohibition on union expenditures that had been
contained in the 1943 Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163 (1943), was added by
the conference committee after its defeat in the Senate. After reviewing the provision, former Labor
Board member Harry Millis asked "whether these matters have any proper place in a law having to
do with industrial relations and labor policy, unless the provision is simply an indication of an effort
to weaken unions and their influence in public life?" H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 598.
The economic power of unions was restricted in a variety of provisions, perhaps most noteworthy
of which was the absolute ban on secondary boycotts that appeared in § 8(b)(4) and in § 303(a)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), 187(a) (1982)). Such a prohibition ignored President
Truman's argument that many secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes had lawful primary objec-
tives, see 93 CONG. REc. 136 (1947), and drew criticism on that basis. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN,
supra note 36, at 459-71. See also id. at 481 ("Not just union abuses, but the bargaining position of
unions in general, was weakened by many of these provisions."). For a more recent critique of the
breadth of the secondary boycott restrictions, see P. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE
(1990).
63. The attitude of organized labor towards the legislation was not helped by the tactics
adopted by its sponsors in the drafting stage. On the House side, the labor committee conducted its
hearings in a witch-hunt atmosphere and then retreated to executive session to work up the bill. On
the Senate side, the labor committee hired as counsel two prominent supporters of Wagner Act
reform who drew objections from organized labor for their bias against trade unions. See H. MILLIS
& E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 365-77.
64. The demand for greater union responsibility, which culminated in the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act and § 301, began in the early years of the century, before the federal government played
any substantial role in regulating industrial conflict. Conservative business groups repeatedly com-
plained that unions were irresponsible and that their structure as voluntary associations made them
unduly difficult to sue. These groups, joined by such liberal reformers as Louis Brandeis, called for
laws mandating the incorporation of trade unions. Incorporation, it was thought, would enable the
firms that signed contracts with trade unions to enforce those agreements freely against the assets of
the union and would induce unions, in turn, to ensure ongoing production during the life of the
contract, free from work stoppages and other interruptions. For a discussion of the drive for incor-
poration, see 3. SEIDMAN, UNION RIGHTS AND UNION DUTIES 163-79 (1943); C. TOMLINS, supra
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in committees, Congress joined Senator Taft in concluding that trade un-
ions were too often able to use their status as voluntary associations to
avoid responsibility in state court for breach of their collective bargaining
agreements. 65 The solution, which Taft developed and proposed, was to
transfer enforcement of labor contracts to federal court and to enact sup-
plemental rules that would subject unions to liability for breach of con-
tract "as if they were corporations., 66 Although the statute formally
provided for the enforcement of labor contracts by both labor and man-
agement, it was principally intended to compel unions to comply with
the no-strike clause. 67
Organized labor unanimously opposed the provision as anti-union, 68
just as it had opposed previous proposals that made unions liable for
breach of labor contracts. 69 As it had with other provisions of Taft-Hart-
note 36, at 84-88; H. MILLIS & R. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 657-61 (1945); Hovenkamp,
Labor Conspiracies in American Law 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 958-62 (1988).
The drive for federal legislation was given additional impetus by decisions of the Labor Board
holding that employers could not insist upon alternative means to secure union compliance with
collective bargaining agreements. The Board held that it was a refusal to bargain, in violation of the
Act, for employers to demand that the union incorporate under state law or post a bond to secure
the employer against breach of the contract. See Jasper Blackburn Prods., 21 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1253-
54 (1940); Scripto Mfg., 36 N.L.R.B. 411, 422 (1941).
65. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 204.
67. The concern with enforcement of no-strike clauses is implicit in the reports and debates of
Congress. See, eg., S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HiST., supra
note 47, at 424 (responding to criticism that unions would decline to make no-strike promises if
section 301 were enacted). See also H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 510-13 (discussing
the impact of § 301's passage on the incidence of no-strike clauses in major collective bargaining
agreements).
68. See infra note 242.
69. Although organized labor had briefly flirted with incorporation during the Gilded Age, and
even went so far as to convince Congress in 1886 to pass a federal statute that enabled unions to
incorporate voluntarily, see Act of June 29, 1886, ch. 567, 24 Stat. 86 (1886), labor has been ada-
mantly opposed to union incorporation and other methods of assuring "union responsibility" for
much of this century. See C. TOMLINS, supra note 36, at 86-87 (quoting Samuel Gompers, president
of the AFL). Union hostility stemmed in part from fears that incorporation would open union
treasuries to large damage awards, a fear given impetus by an English decision in 1901 that upheld a
large judgment against a registered trade union. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 64, at 165-68 (citing
English decision in Taff Vale as decisive factor in trade union hostility towards incorporation). In
addition, unions feared that, once incorporated, their internal structure and affairs would be subject
to control by state legislatures. See id. at 176-77; Hovenkamp, supra note 64, at 961-62. Congress
repealed the Federal Union Incorporation Act in 1932, after learning that its provisions, while
largely ignored by unions, had been exploited by benefit societies to escape state insurance regula-
tion. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 64, at 165.
Unions also bitterly opposed a series of state laws, urged by the League for Industrial Rights as
part of the open-shop movement of the 1920s, that were designed to make unions, and other volun-
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ley, however, labor mustered little support in Congress for its position.
Even President Truman, whose veto of Taft-Hartley was promptly over-
ridden, had expressed support for legislation that would require unions
to adhere faithfully to their written agreements. 70  Those who opposed
the statute in Congress did so on the ground that labor contracts were
already freely enforceable in state court;71 little opposition existed in
Congress to Taft's argument that unions, like employers, should comply
with their promises or to his assumption that the task of remedying viola-
tions of the collective bargaining agreement was a matter appropriate for
judicial cognizance.72
Despite the consensus in Congress, many students of industrial rela-
tions expressed misgivings about the federal courts' new role in policing
the collective bargaining agreement.73 These concerns arose in part from
tary associations, subject to suit in state court. For a summary of such laws, and the efforts of unions
to block their passage, see H. MILLIs & R. MONTGOMERY, supra note 64, at 659-60. Another wave
of union responsibility laws were proposed in state legislatures following the passage of the Wagner
Act. See H. MILLIs & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 316-32. As one contemporary commentator
pointed out, these initiatives were regarded by organized labor as a "legislative declaration of war
against labor unions." Dodd, Some State Legislatures Go To War - on Labor Unions, 29 IOWA L.
REv. 148, 174 (1944).
70. See 93 CONG. REc. 136 (1947) ("Collective bargaining agreements, like other contracts,
should be faithfully adhered to by both parties.").
71. Testimony by Secretary of Labor Lewis Schwellenbach indicated that collective bargaining
agreements were enforceable against unincorporated labor unions in the great majority of states. See
infra note 242. The minority members of the Senate labor committee cited this testimony in arguing
that § 301 was unnecessary. See SENATE MINORrry REPORT ON S. 1126, S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15, reprinted in I LEGIS. Hisr., supra note 47, at 474-77. The minority also
echoed Schwellenbach's claim that, by requiring federal judges to apply state law, the provision
conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts of doubtful constitutionality-the argument later picked
up by Justice Frankfurter. See id. at 14, reprinted in 1 LEcis. HisT., supra note 47, at 476. Finally,
the minority argued that provisions for Labor Board enforcement of labor contracts, later dropped
in conference, see infra note 257, would encourage the parties to ignore available machinery for
arbitration and conciliation of disputes. See id. at 12, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 47, at
474.
72. As noted earlier, the opposition to § 301 in Congress focused on the availability of state
court remedies for violations of labor contracts. See supra note 71. Thus, the question was not
whether judges were to enforce labor contracts but whether the judges were to be state or federal.
73. Many students of industrial relations in the post-war era believed that national labor policy
should encourage labor and management to work out the details of industrial governance, free from
the involvement of the federal government. Such a view of industrial policy has been most closely
associated with the industrial pluralists, who viewed unions, freely chosen by the workers in Board-
sponsored elections, as the instruments of an industrial democracy. On the tenets of pluralist
thought, see Stone, The Post- War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981). For
a critique of Stone's claim that pluralist ideology controlled the evolution of labor policy, see Finkin,
Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REv. 23, 54-84 (1984).
Pluralists generally attacked Taft-Hartley for its bias in favor of employers. See C. TOMLINS,
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the fear that employers and unions would submit disputes over contract
interpretation to courts directly, rather than resolving those disputes
themselves through mutual discussions and grievance arbitration.74
Apart from concern that litigation would undermine negotiation and ar-
bitration-a method of industrial dispute resolution that had emerged
during the war and was to grow increasingly popular in the post-war
period7 5-industrial relations scholars feared that the courts would sim-
supra note 36, at 278 (collecting views of William Lieserson, E. Wight Bakke, and Edwin Witte,
among others); H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 459-71 (criticizing Taft-Hartley's unbal-
anced restrictions of organized labor). Many of the same scholars criticized § 301 for its tendency to
"force labor relations more and more into the political arena and into the hands of lawyers and the
courts." C. TOMLINS, supra note 36, at 278 (quoting George Taylor, labor historian at Cornell). See
also F. WITNEY, GOVERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 393 (1951) ("No feature of Taft-
Hartley is more inimical to the effective operation of the collective bargaining process than its en-
couragement of court proceedings as the means for the enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments."); H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 504-08 (expressing concern that the statute
failed to make provision for exhaustion of arbitral remedies).
74. The classic statement of opposition to the recognition of a judicial role in policing the col-
lective bargaining agreement was predicated on the fear that courts would upset the arbitral process.
See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024 (1955)
(arguing that when the arbitral process works well, it does not need the sanction of law and when it
breaks down, courts cannot repair the damage). See also F. WrrNEY, supra note 73, at 394 (expres-
sing the concern that the availability ofjudicial remedies would detract from the settlement of dis-
putes through mutual negotiation and grievance arbitration). For a more recent restatement of the
argument that the courts should stay out, see H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
121-25 (1968).
Much the same argument was made during the 1950s by supporters of labor arbitration who
claimed that the courts, both state and federal, were interfering with the arbitral process by narrowly
construing the scope of the arbitration clause or by reviewing too closely the arbitrator's award. See
Rosenfarb, The Court and Arbitration, in PROCEEDINGS OF N.Y.U. SIxTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
ON LABOR LAW 161 (E. Stein ed. 1953); Kharas, Labor Arbitration-The Arbitrable Issue, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF N.Y.U. FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR LAW 633 (E. Stein ed. 1952); Greg-
ory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 233 (1950).
It was judicial intrusion into the arbitrator's realm that Professor Cox argued against in a series of
articles that presaged the Court's decisions in the Steelworkers' Trilogy. See infra note 289. In
arguing for appropriate judicial deference, however, Cox parted company with Shulman, who ar-
gued that the courts should neither compel arbitration nor review the merits of the resulting award.
75. Although labor and management had some experience with the arbitration of industrial
disputes before World War II, government policy during the war did much to encourage reliance on
arbitration. See F. WITNEY, supra note 73, at 561-69; N. LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR'S WAR AT HOME
178-82 (1982); H. HARRIS, supra note 36, at 49-50. Grievance arbitration was given an additional
boost by President Truman's National Labor-Management Conference of 1945, which agreed on
little save the wisdom of voluntary arbitration. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 306-
10. In any case, the incidence of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements increased
dramatically in the post-war era: the figure increased from roughly 73% of the agreements in 1944
to 83% in 1949 and to 91% in 1952. See E. MOORE & J. Nix, ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 1952, at 10-11 (Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 1142, 1952).
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ply resolve disputes unfairly, either by adopting ill-conceived general
rules or by approaching their task with little understanding of the union's
role in industrial relations.76 Thus, the view that federal courts were in-
stitutionally incapable of resolving labor contract disputes reflected a dis-
trust of the judiciary reminiscent of that expressed in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.77 It was this distrust of the federal courts that Justice
Frankfurter was to express in his Lincoln Mills dissent.
C. Lincoln Mills: The Brethren
Although Justices Douglas and Frankfurter began their tenure on the
Court as relatively good friends, their relationship had soured long before
they divided on the constitutionality of section 301 in Lincoln Mills. 78
Differences in style and temperament certainly played a part,7 9 but their
mutual disdain was in good measure attributable to their differing con-
ceptions of the judicial role. 0 Following in what he regarded as the
76. Again, Harry Shulman was the leading exponent of the view that the court simply lacked
sufficient experience with industrial conflict to work out sensible rules to govern the collective bar-
gaining agreement. See Shulman, supra note 74, at 1024. See also F. W1TNEY, supra note 73, at 394
(judges are fitted "neither by training nor by temperament for the task of resolving contract viola-
tions"). Harry Wellington pushes the argument a step further in attempting to show that the
Court's contract enforcement decisions themselves reveal the judiciary's inability to compose indus-
trial conflict. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 74, at 100-25.
77. See Act of March 23, 1932, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1988)). For discussion of the origins and content of Norris-LaGuardia, see infra notes 93-94.
78. See supra note 5.
79. Both intellectual disagreement and personal animosity fueled the split between Frankfurter
and Douglas. In a letter to Justice Jackson, Frankfurter described Douglas as "the most cynical,
shamelessly immoral character I've ever known. With him, I have no more relation than the necessi-
ties of court work require." H. HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 182. Frankfurter was particularly incensed
by Douglas's willingness to seek public office as a sitting member of the Court. Frankfurter was
convinced that Douglas had asked him to talk down the possibility of a Douglas draft for the 1940
vice-presidential nomination in an effort to fuel speculation about the Douglas candidacy. See
BRANDEIS AND FRANx-URTER, supra note 5, at 420. See also H. HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 177-78.
Another episode involved Justice Douglas's order staying the execution of the Rosenbergs, which
Frankfurter viewed as a last minute "grandstand play" designed to curry favor with the liberal
community. Id. at 456-60. For a review of the Rosenberg case, see White, The Anti-Judge: William
0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REv. 17, 49-65 (1988).
Douglas returned the disdain measure for measure. In a memorandum written in 1954, Douglas
took Frankfurter to task for his insolent refusal to answer a question Douglas had raised in confer-
ence; he went on to note the "great burden" of "your long discourses." W. DOUGLAS, THE DOUG-
LAS LETTERS, supra note 5, at 85. See also W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 5, at 22.
Matters eventually grew so tense that Douglas considered refusing to participate in conferences with
Frankfurter. W. DOUGLAS, THE DOUGLAS LETTERS, supra note 5, at 90.
80. Professor Urofsky's recent study of the division between Douglas and Frankfurter notes the
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Holmes-Brandeis tradition,"1 Frankfurter thought the Court should in-
terpret the Constitution to permit the elected representatives of govern-
ment wide latitude in resolving conflicts of social policy.8 2  Although
Frankfurter's theory of judicial restraint produced agreement with Doug-
las in the area of economic regulation,"3 it created deep divisions in cases
involving individual liberties, where Douglas, Black, and others thought
the Court was obliged to play a more active role.84 The division between
personal animosity that developed in their relationship but attributes the division to philosophical
differences in their approach to judging. See Urofsky, supra note 5, at 71.
81. Frankfurter was a friend, confidant and ardent admirer of both Holmes and Brandeis. See
BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 5, at 425, 429-31, 433; H. HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 128-
32; W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT 115-17
(1961); H. THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 368-71 (1960). In describ-
ing them as judicial "statesmen," Frankfurter paid them his highest compliment. See F. FRANK-
FURTER, Mr. Justice Holmes's Constitutional Opinions, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME
COURT 112, 122 (P. Kurland ed. 1970); F. FRANKFURTER, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitu-
tion, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 247, 251 (P. Kurland ed. 1970).
82. Justice Frankfurter's attitude towards legislation in the industrial arena certainly reflected
his view that the Court must accord the legislature wide latitude in attempting to strike an appropri-
ate balance "between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective
interests." Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958). Thus,
Frankfurter often voted to uphold restrictive labor legislation, just as he had urged the Supreme
Court in the 1920s to uphold more progressive reforms. See H. THOMAS, supra note 5, at 82-87.
83. Frankfurter was to tolerate a much wider range of governmental involvement in economic
matters than that permitted by the Supreme Court that struck down twelve Acts of Congress in
Roosevelt's first term as President and precipitated FDR's well known court-packing plan. See
BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 5, at 319-36. Douglas also favored a broad role for the
federal government in dealing with the economic crisis of the 1930s. He had served as a commis-
sioner and later chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission during the 1930s; he joined
the Court in 1939 and consistently voted with majorities to uphold federal regulatory authority. See
C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-47,
71-90 (1948).
84. Many scholars have commented upon the intense commitment to judicial restraint that led
Frankfurter to adopt a stance of deference to government activities that Douglas and Black regarded
as unconstitutional restrictions on the exercise of first amendment rights. No better example can be
cited than Frankfurter's approach to the flag-salute cases. In Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586 (1940), Frankfurter noted that a local school board could lawfully require public school
students to salute the flag, even if such salutes violated their deeply held religious beliefs. Justices
Black and Douglas joined him initially, but reversed their views a few years later. See West Virginia
State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943). Frankfurter dissented in Barnette and
privately complained that Douglas and Black had let public opinion control their views. For com-
ments that describe the impact of the Gobitis and Barnette opinions on Frankfurter's evolving sense
of judicial restraint, his deteriorating relations with Black and Douglas, and that point out percep-
tively the differences between Frankfurter and his mentors, Holmes and Brandeis, on civil liberties,
see J. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 68-73 (1975) (to assert that the Court
had no larger function in the protection of civil liberties than of property rights was a fateful refine-
ment of Frankfurter's position); BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 5, at 399-409; H.
HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 147-53, 171-76 (Frankfurter takes fateful step in describing himself as an
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the two Justices was also evident in matters of statutory construction.8"
Douglas believed that remedial statutes were owed a relatively generous
interpretation; 6 Frankfurter's narrower view reflected his respect for the
compromise that produced the legislation87 and his concern for preserv-
ing the role of the states in the federal system.88
Frankfurter's commitment to his particular vision of judicial restraint
associate of Holmes in refusing to recognize favored constitutional values). Douglas himself de-
scribes Barnette as the decision that triggered the split with Frankfurter. See J. SIMON, supra note 5,
at 11-12.
85. The differing approaches of Justices Frankfurter and Douglas to the task of statutory inter-
pretation was well illustrated by their interpretation of federal workplace injury statutes such as the
Federal Employers Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1982)), and the
Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982)). In these statutes, Congress
permitted recovery to employees working in the rail and maritime industries upon a showing of
negligence. In a series of decisions, Justices Douglas and Black widened the definition of negligence
to a degree that made recovery available essentially without any showing of fault. In addition,
Douglas and Black limited the power of state court judges to set aside jury verdicts for insufficient
evidence and thus assured that the sympathies of the jury would produce verdicts for injured work-
ers in most cases. Finally, Douglas and Black freely exercised the certiorari power to bring cases to
the Court that were later reversed in short one-sentence per curiam decisions.
That Douglas and Black engaged in the process of judicially updating an obsolete system of com-
pensation has now been widely accepted, although the success of the effort has received mixed re-
views. Compare G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 32-35, 153-55
(1982) (Douglas and Black brought the compensation system more in line with the prevailing legal
topography) with W. MENDELSON, supra note 81, at 22-30 (criticizing Black for amending the stat-
ute through judicial decree rather than awaiting the action of Congress). In any case, Frankfurter
stoutly resisted the process as a matter for Congress, rather than the Court. See, eg., Ferguson v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 538-40 (1957) (dissenting opinion); Dick v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 458-61 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
86. Douglas's willingness to construe broadly remedial statutes was evident in his agreement
with Black in the FELA and Jones Act cases, see supra note 85, as well as others. For a collection of
cases, see V. COUNTRYMAN, THE JUDICIAL RECORD OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 320-22
(1974).
87. Frankfurter's approach to the task of statutory interpretation reflected his understanding
that competing groups within legislatures must compromise to produce a consensus on the reach of a
statute. See, eg., Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943) (adopting more limited view of the
reach of amendment to revenue laws than that proposed in dissent by Douglas). In respecting the
legislative compromise, Frankfurter believed that he was upholding the supremacy of legislatures as
lawmaking bodies, just as he did in insisting on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. See W.
MENDELSON, supra note 81, at 30-33.
88. Frankfurter's concern for preserving the state's role in the federal system is well docu-
mented in opinions that argue for a broad interpretation of the Erie doctrine, see Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), for a narrow conception of the power of Congress to compel states
to hear federal claims, see Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
and for limits on the extent to which federal courts may, in the course of fashioning federal common
law, ignore the content of existing state law. See Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
For an explicit argument that the preservation of the state's role was a relevant factor in statutory
interpretation, see Frankfurter, supra note 20, at 539-40.
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had been shaped, in no small part, by his work in the field of industrial
relations.89 As a professor of law at Harvard in the 1920s, Frankfurter
demonstrated that the Supreme Court's anti-union decisions owed more
to the political beliefs of conservative justices than to the explicit com-
mand of the constitutional and statutory provisions at issue in the
cases.' He adopted much the same theme in attacking the labor injunc-
tion as an instrument with which the federal courts regulated, and
largely nullified, the use by organized labor of such economic weapons as
the strike and the boycott.91 Frankfurter was thus convinced that the
federal courts were institutionally unsuited to the task of developing a
89. As a labor mediator during World War I, Frankfurter attracted the hostility of many con-
servatives by his firm but by no means radical support for the legitimate grievances of workers. See
M. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 83-117 (1982). Frank-
furter remained a progressive in labor matters following his return to the Harvard faculty in 1919-a
fact reflected both in his continual criticism of the Supreme Court's labor jurisprudence and in his
defense of Sacco and Vanzetti. Id. at 150-96; L. BAKER, supra note 5, at 90-130.
90. In a series of articles and unsigned editorials that appeared in The New Republic, Frank-
furter sounded now familiar themes in attacking the Court's developing labor jurisprudence. For
one thing, Frankfurter expressed the view that the Court should refrain from nullifying labor legisla-
tion on constitutional grounds. For Frankfurter, the availability of injunctive relief in labor disputes
was fundamentally a political question to which legislatures were entitled to speak decisively.
Frankfurter thus argued that in decisions such as Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), which
struck down a state law prohibiting injunctive relief in labor disputes, the Court's conservative jus-
tices improperly transformed their personal views into constitutional protection for business inter-
ests. See F. FRANKFURTER, Taft and the Supreme Court, in FELix FRANKFURTER ON THE
SUPREME COURT 49, 60 (P. Kurland ed. 1970). In the process, Frankfurter believed, the Court
frustrated the power of the states to manage local affairs. Id. at 66.
Frankfurter also believed that, once the legislature had spoken, the Court was duty bound to
respect its decision. Frankfurter thus criticized Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921), a decision eviscerating legislation that Congress had enacted to immunize organized labor
from judicial interference. For Frankfurter, the Duplex case violated the fundamental principle that
the Court must carry into effect the will of Congress rather than adopting a strained construction
that nullifies the legislative purpose. See F. FRANKFURTER, The "Law" and Labor, in FELIX
FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 68, 72-73 (P. Kurland ed. 1970).
91. Frankfurter was an early, committed, and persuasive critic of the labor injunction. In 1922,
shortly after the Attorney General of the United States obtained an extraordinarily broad injunction
in a railway dispute in Chicago, Frankfurter attacked the whole history of the labor injunction in
industrial conflict: "It does not work. It neither mines coal, nor moves trains, nor makes clothing.
As an adjustor of industrial conflict, the injunction has been an utter failure." F. FRANKFURTER,
Labor Injunctions Must Go, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 104, 107 (P. Kur-
land ed. 1970). He followed this broadside with more complete studies of the use of injunctions in
labor disputes. See Frankfurter & Greene, Labor Injunctions and Federal Legislation, 42 HARv. L.
REv. 766 (1929); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). In that classic
text, Frankfurter demonstrated that labor injunctions were often granted on an ex parte basis and
enforced in contempt proceedings to which the right to trial by jury did not attach. In addition to
these procedural flaws, Frankfurter showed that, in deciding whether to enjoin particular strikes and
boycotts, federal judges permitted their own anti-union attitudes to inform their assessment of the
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workable body of rules to govern industrial conflict between laboi' and
management.92
It was a conviction upon which he acted, both on and off the Court.
While still a professor, Frankfurter served as the principal draftsman of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 9 3 -legislation designed to remove the
federal courts from the business of regulating industrial relations by de-
nying them jurisdiction to enter injunctions in peaceful labor disputes.94
Shortly after he joined the Court, Frankfurter's opinion for the majority
in United States v. Hutcheson,95 immunized many union-sponsored, sec-
lawfulness of both the ends that labor sought to achieve and the means by which it sought to accom-
plish them.
92. Frankfurter was thus opposed not to the proposition that unions must conduct their affairs
in accordance with law but to what he perceived as the hostile regulation of industrial conflict
through the labor injunction. Thus, Frankfurter agreed with what he regarded as the Court's essen-
tially procedural conclusion that unions were subject as entities to claims for damages under the
antitrust laws. See F. FRANKFURTER, The Coronado Case, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE
SUPREME COURT 97, 101 (P. Kurland ed. 1970) (commenting on the Court's decision in United
Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922)). The central question, according to
Frankfurter, was how society should define the substantive rules that would govern industrial con-
flict. Id. at 101-02. It was in the definition of such substantive rules that Frankfurter sought to
preserve the primacy of the legislative voice.
93. For an account of Frankfurter's role in drafting Norris-LaGuardia, see L. BAKER, supra
note 5, at 134-36.
94. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982)),
attempted to cure the specific problems with the labor injunction that Frankfurter had identified.
Thus, the statute deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes, see
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), a term the statute broadly and specifically defined to avoid the possibility of
judicial nullification. Id. at § 113. A listing of specific union activities that were beyond the courts'
power to enjoin supported this definition. The list included strikes, boycotts, picketing, and public-
ity, so long as fraud and violence were not involved. Id. at § 104. Although the Act permitted the
courts to enjoin the commission of "unlawful acts," it imposed a variety of procedural safeguards
that were intended to ensure that findings of unlawful conduct were made on the basis of facts
adduced from testimony in open court following notice to those against whom relief was sought. Id.
at § 107.
The statute was thus structured entirely as a limitation on the power of the federal courts to enjoin
the actions of unions; it does not affirmatively protect the tactics of organized labor either from
regulation by the states or from the self-help measures of employers. Nor does it purport to define
the substantive content of federal labor policy in criminal proceedings or in actions to recover dam-
ages under other federal laws. For useful discussions of Norris-LaGuardia, emphasizing these limi-
tations, see C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 186 (2d ed. Supp. 1961); H. WELLINGTON, supra
note 74, at 39-41.
95. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). Hutcheson arose from a jurisdictional dispute between the carpenters
and the machinists over the right to perform work at a brewery in St. Louis. When the employer
awarded the work to the machinists, the carpenters struck the plant and organized a boycott of the
company's beer. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department commenced a criminal prosecu-
tion of William Hutcheson, the president of the carpenters union, in keeping with its then recently
announced intention to prosecute restrictive union practices under the Sherman Act.
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ondary boycotts from judicial scrutiny under the Sherman Act.9 6 In
Hutcheson, Frankfurter applied Norris-LaGuardia97 in a relatively unre-
strained way to accomplish the larger goal of restraining the federal
courts from shaping labor policy.9"
96. The prosecution's theory was quite sound as a matter of law, despite the fact that it rested
on some of the Court's most blatantly anti-union precedents from earlier years. The Court had held
as early as 1908 that union participation in a secondary boycott of the kind the carpenters initiated
against the beer company was a violation of the Sherman Act. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908). Although the Clayton Act had contained language that appeared to reverse that decision,
the Court ruled otherwise in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). Thus, at
least some basis existed for contending, as the government did, that by leading a secondary boycott
union officers engaged in a criminal restraint of trade. The Court gave additional plausibility to the
government's theory only one year before the Hutcheson prosecution, in Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), when it distinguished, rather than overruled, the Duplex decision in the
course of holding that a sit-down strike in Philadelphia was immune from antitrust scrutiny.
97. According to Frankfurter's opinion in Hutcheson, the Norris-LaGuardia Act's declaration
of public policy had implicitly rejected the Court's decision in Duplex and thus restored the Clayton
Act to its original breadth. See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 231. Freed from the restrictive interpretation
in Duplex, § 20 of the Clayton Act served to immunize organized labor's self-help activities from
scrutiny under the Sherman Act, "[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups... ." Id. at 232. Thus, the Duplex decision that the Court distinguished a
year earlier in Apex, see supra note 96, had been dead since 1932.
The difficulty with Frankfurter's interpretation lay in its willingess to ascribe to Norris-LaGuardia
an intention to refine the definition of union liability under the antitrust laws. While Norris-La-
Guardia had deprived the courts of the power to remedy union antitrust violations by injunction, it
neither amended substantive antitrust law nor prohibited the federal courts from entertaining crimi-
nal and civil enforcement proceedings. It was on this basis that Justice Roberts, in dissent, attacked
Frankfurter's interpretation as a usurpation of the function of Congress, Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 246
(Roberts, J., dissenting)-a view with which many commentators have agreed. See C. PRITCHETr,
THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES 283 (1948) (Frankfurter's
decision in Hutcheson was "perhaps the most flagrant example of judicial legislating" during the
previous ten years).
98. Frankfurter's opinion in Hutcheson thus adopts an approach to the antitrust laws remarka-
bly similar to that he later developed in connection with § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Frankfurter
could have overruled Duplex and its outmoded, essentially anti-union ban on secondary boycotts.
From Frankfurter's perspective, however, such an approach would implicitly confirm the power of
the federal courts to judge the legitimacy of labor's economic weapons, a task for which Frankfurter
was convinced the courts were unsuited. Rather than participate in a new era of judicial legislation
under the Sherman Act, Frankfurter adopted a creative interpretation of Norris-LaGuardia that
immunized a wide range of union conduct from judicial scrutiny. In the perceptive words of one
observer, Frankfurter "legislat[ed] a little to avoid legislating a lot" and, in the process, returned the
task of defining labor policy to Congress. W. MENDELSON, supra note 81, at 36.
Frankfurter used much the same strategy to accomplish precisely the same goal in Lincoln Mills.
Frankfurter's conclusion that § 301 transgressed the limits of judicial power in article III was predi-
cated on an exceedingly strained interpretation of the history of the legislation. It was, moreover,
adopted to prevent the federal courts from undertaking to fashion a body of judge-made law to
govern the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements-a result that would force more explicit
congressional action.
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Although he joined the Court's opinion in Hutcheson and probably
shared Frankfurter's suspicion of the motives that led to the passage of
Taft-Hartley, Douglas was much less dogmatically committed to the no-
tion that the federal courts were unsuited to the task of making labor
law. For one thing, Douglas had an abiding faith in the capacity of the
federal courts to remedy injustices of every description,99 a faith that car-
ried with it great confidence in the lawmaking powers of the federal
courts. 10° Thus, it seems doubtful that Douglas viewed any subject as
unfit for the exercise of judicial creativity, whether by virtue of its com-
plexity' or its tendency to excite the passions and biases of the judici-
99. More perhaps than any other member of the avowedly activist Warren Court, Douglas was
willing to use the power of the Supreme Court to remedy what he perceived as injustice-a fact for
which he makes no apology in his autobiography: "My view always has been that anyone whose life,
liberty or property was threatened or impaired by any branch of government ... could properly
repair to a judicial tribunal for vindication of his rights." W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra
note 5, at 55. Douglas thus joined, and often wrote, opinions for the Warren Court that struck down
school desegregation, compelled legislative reapportionment, revolutionized criminal procedure, and
protected procreative rights. For critical reviews of these developments, see infra note 104.
In keeping with his general position on judicial power, Douglas almost uniformly adopted a more
hospitable conception of the power of judicial review than did Frankfurter, who believed that Con-
gress possessed plenary control over the extent of reviewability and could curtail such review quite
sharply. See, eg., Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This was
particularly true in cases in which Douglas believed that the regulatory scheme provided insufficient
protection to individuals. Thus, while Douglas argued for deference to agency regulation of business
enterprise in federal rate-making cases, see Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591 (1944), he was quite creative in constructing mechanisms to secure judicial review of ac-
tions that curtailed the rights of individuals. See C. PRITCHETr, supra note 97, at 185-89.
100. Douglas was frequently the author of opinions that conferred on the federal courts a broad
role in regulating the details of the nation's economic life. In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363 (1943), Douglas held that the federal courts were free to disregard state law in fashion-
ing uniform rules to govern the rights and duties of the United States in commercial paper. Douglas
also essentially rewrote the rules governing divorce and alimony in the United States; his opinions in
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), and Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), hold that
although state courts may exercise jurisdiction to grant a divorce on the basis of jurisdiction over a
single party to the marriage, they may not determine questions of support without jurisdiction over
both parties. Finally, Douglas developed the "one-man, one-vote" formula on which the court based
its reapportionment decisions. See A. BICKEL, POLrICS AND THE WARREN COURT 196 (1965).
His faith in the federal courts may have reflected nothing more profound than a supreme confi.
dence in himself and his colleagues on the Court; Douglas was certainly willing to use the Court's
certiorari power to correct errors in the lower courts that many observers, including Frankfurter,
thought were unworthy of Supreme Court attention. Compare Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53,
68-69 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) with id. at 76 (Jackson, J., dissenting) and with Dick v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 458-61 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
101. Douglas refused to permit the complexity of the subject matter to excuse judicial inaction.
He was thus quite active in fashioning antitrust law and was among the justices responsible for the
increasing use of economic analysis in that field. See Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust
Laws:" Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 336 (1968) (describing Black
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ary.' °2 Consequently, Douglas earned a reputation, at Harvard and
elsewhere,103 for practicing a particularly unrestrained brand of judicial
activism that frequently was said to injure the Court's prestige.1°4 In any
and Douglas as the leading exponents of the Warren Court's antitrust policy and the growing cyni-
cism that policy fostered among members of the antitrust bar).
102. In rejecting a judicial role in labor disputes, Frankfurter expressed the view that industrial
conflict was simply too divisive to admit of neutral decisionmaking by judges. The possibility of
such bias generally would not have troubled Douglas, either in himself or others. Douglas thought
his task as a judge necessarily entailed rendering an essentially personal judgment on deeply divisive
matters of public concern; he was far less concerned than Frankfurter with the task of building a
majority or in the manner in which other justices did their work. See White, supra note 79, at 79-81;
Urofsky, supra note 5, at 113.
103. Frankfurter encouraged his friends and law clerks to adopt his sneering view of the "liber-
als" - Justices Douglas and Black-to whom he referred as the "children of light" or the "non-
judicial twain of Justices." H. HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 180, 182. Whether as a result of his efforts or
otherwise, Frankfurter's view of the liberals achieved a measure of currency at Harvard and else-
where. Thus, one Frankfurter clerk from the 1950s remarked that "[i]f you came from Harvard Law
School, you thought Black and Douglas were clowns." BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER, supra note
5, at 419.
Frankfurter also explicitly encouraged his former law clerks to attack the Court for unprincipled
decisionmaking. In a letter to Alexander Bickel, a former clerk and then professor of law, Frank-
furter writes: "I can assure you that explicit analysis and criticism of the way the Court is doing its
business really gets under their skin.... You law professors should really sharpen your pens so that
there is no mistaking as to what the trouble is and where the blame lies." H. HIRSCH, supra note 5,
at 183 (quoting letter from Frankfurter to Bickel).
Frankfurter was undoubtedly correct that critical notices in the law reviews got under the "skin"
of Justice Douglas. Douglas's letters express resentment of Frankfurter's "stooges," W. DOUGLAS,
THE DoUGLAS LETTERS, supra note 5, at 96, and his autobiography makes repeated reference to the
pernicious influence of those in the "Harvard cabal" who described Douglas as an "activist," to the
Frankfurter "disciples" who disagreed with Douglas's interpretation of the 14th amendment, and to
the "flying squadrons" of law clerks that Frankfurter dispatched to influence the views of the clerks
of other justices. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 5, at 55, 53, 173.
104. Throughout his career on the Court, Justice Douglas was the subject of repeated attacks for
unprincipled decisionmaking. For a sample of such views, see Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963
Term-Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of
the Government," 78 HARV. L. REv. 143, 145 (1964) (generally criticizing the absence, in the War-
ren Court opinions, of "workmanlike product" and scornfully dismissing Douglas's "slambang"
opinions); Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Pro-
motion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 95-96 (1966) (Douglas opinion in Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) "expressly or impliedly repudiates every conventional
guide to legal judgment"); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 97
(1970); A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RE-
FORM 125-26 (1968); M. SHAPIRO, supra note 17. Such assertions became so common that Judge
Skelly Wright was moved to ask, "What else is new?" Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tra-
dition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 770 (1971).
Retrospective assessments have been no less unkind. See Bork, Foreword to G. McDoWELL,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY at vii (1985) (Douglas's re-
sult in Harper was not justified "in terms of the historic Constitution or in terms of any other
profferred basis for contstitutional decisionmaking"); White, supra note 79, at 17, 70 (Douglas re-
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case, Douglas regarded the struggle between labor and management es-
sentially as a clash of economic interests,10 5 the mediation of which re-
quired the government, its agencies, and its courts to exercise a relatively
broad range of regulatory control."c6
sponded to the absence of doctrinal support for his reproductive rights decisions by "simply creating
constitutional doctrine on the spot"). See also B. WOLFMAN, J. SILVER & M. SILVER, DISSENT
WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES
43-60 (1975) (discussing Douglas's unjustified support for the taxpayer in cases involving the Inter-
nal Revenue Service).
105. Douglas had grown up in the Pacific Northwest and counted members of the Industrial
Workers of the World or Wobblies among his friends and acquaintances. See W. DOUGLAS, THE
COURT YEAS, supra note 5, at 75-85. But while Douglas instinctively sympathized with the work-
ers themselves, he had less appreciation for organized labor, particularly in the period following
World War II. It was during this period, according to Douglas, that the newly merged AFL-CIO
abandoned its progressive social agenda and focused solely on narrow economic gain. Thus, Doug-
las regarded organized labor as allied with either the forces of reaction and the status quo, or the
forces of corruption. Id. at 422-23. In this respect, Douglas's view resembled that of C. Wright
Mills, who described unions in 1956 as lacking the political or economic direction to play an impor-
tant role in controlling the shape of public policy. See C. WRIOHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 265
(1956).
106. Justice Douglas held a broad conception of the constitutional power of the legislature to
regulate the workplace and frequently voted to adopt a more liberal view of the Labor Board's power
to interpret and apply the substantive provisions of the Wagner Act than the majority was willing to
sustain. See V. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 86, at 323. While many of these opinions would have
been supported by unions, Douglas was equally willing to uphold laws that regulated organized
labor. Thus, Douglas voted to uphold the power of the states to pass right-to-work laws and joined
decisions that forbade unions from spending funds collected under union-shop collective bargaining
agreements on political causes to which individual, dues-paying employees object. Id. at 326-27.
Moreover, Douglas also joined opinions that imposed on unions the obligation to represent fairly all
members of the bargaining units in which they have established representational rights. Id. at 327
n.27. Finally, Douglas dissented from the Court's decision to uphold the Labor Board's application
of the Wagner Act to supervisory personnel, arguing that the Act contemplated some separation
between labor and management. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493-94 (1947)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
To the extent Douglas's opinions share a common thread, therefore, they tend to uphold the
power of the government to regulate both labor and management. See B. WOLFMAN, J. SILVER &
M. SILVER, supra note 104, at 105 (neither union nor management preference dominates Douglas's
approach to labor cases). As Douglas explained in his autobiography, "[b]ig unions grew in the
shadow of big business," and were subject to government regulation on that basis. W. DOUGLAS,
THE COURT YEARS, supra note 5, at 166.
At the same time he permitted agencies to regulate labor and management, however, Douglas
consistently expressed solicitude for the rights of individual employees. Thus, while Douglas joined
opinions under the Railway Labor Act that affirmed the primacy of the National Joint Adjustment
Board in resolving contract disputes between unions and employers, see Slocum v. Delaware, L. &
W. R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Southern Ry., 339 U.S. 255 (1950), he also
joined a majority that confirmed the right of individual employees to seek judicial review of their
claims under such contracts. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehear-
ing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). For subsequent developments in this line of cases, see Feller, supra note
12, at 683-86, 692-700.
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To summarize, Justice Frankfurter was convinced that the federal
courts were institutionally incapable of regulating industrial disputes.
Furthermore, Frankfurter quite willingly, at least in Hutcheson, ignored
conventional norms of judicial restraint in the reading of statutes to
achieve the larger goal of restricting the judicial role in industrial con-
flict. Douglas shared neither Frankfurter's obsessive concern with judi-
cial restraint, nor his hostility towards judge-made labor law. While it
was perhaps inevitable that the Lincoln Mills case would divide the two
Justices, it is worth asking whether the division owed more to Frank-
furter's hostility to judicial lawmaking than to Douglas's unrestrained
reading of the legislative materials.
D. Lincoln Mills: The Opinions
Any discussion of the Lincoln Mills decision must acknowledge that
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court was something less than a model
of judicial craftmanship. In an opinion that controlled the outcome of
three cases, 10 7 Douglas held that section 301 empowers the federal courts
to enter an order compelling an employer to honor its agreement to sub-
mit disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement to binding
arbitration. 108 In the course of upholding the federal courts' power to
enforce arbitration agreements in particular, Douglas supplied answers
to three questions that had produced a "contrariety of views" among the
lower federal courts."° The briskness with which Douglas announced
these conclusions-his opinion runs only twelve pages in length-un-
doubtedly contributed to the perception that he was merely announcing a
result rather than conducting a reasoned elaboration of the statute. 10
107. The Court relied on the opinion in Lincoln Mills to decide two companion cases. In Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547, 548 (1957), the Court affirmed
the First Circuit's decision upholding the power of the district court to compel arbitration. But the
Court expressly disavowed the lower court's reliance on the United States Arbitration Act, stating
that it was following a different path to reach the same result. Id. at 548. Likewise, in Goodall-
Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 550, 551-52 (1957), the Court affirmed an order
compelling arbitration and added a note to indicate its view that such an order was final for purposes
of appellate review.
108. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
109. Id. at 449, 450-51 nn.1 & 2 (collecting conflicting lower court authority).
110. It was, of course, well within Douglas's capabilities as a lawyer to undertake a detailed
analysis of the language and structure of statutes or the origins and evolution of constitutional doc-
trine in the course of writing for the Court. See, eg., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942) (undertaking detailed doctrinal analysis in the course of adopting new test for jurisdiction in
divorce cases). But as others have noted, Douglas frequently eschewed traditional doctrinal analysis,
particularly in his later years on the bench. See infra note 267.
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Douglas first found that section 301 was more than jurisdictional, rul-
ing that it also authorized federal courts to fashion a body of federal law
for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.III He next held
that the congressional decision to make such contracts binding and en-
forceable embraced both the union's no-strike promise and its quid pro
quo-the employer's agreement to submit disputes arising under the
agreement to arbitration." 2 Finally, he found evidence that Congress
intended to make arbitration agreements specifically enforceable,113 an
111. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451. As a doctrinal matter, Douglas's opinion offers little analy-
sis of § 301. After quoting the statute, he notes the differing views of the lower courts and announces
that the Court agrees with the overwhelming weight of lower court authority to the effect that § 301
was more than jurisdictional. Id. at 449-51. Although some inkling of Douglas's interpretation of
the statute may be gleaned from his description of Judge Wyzanski's opinion as the leading represen-
tation of the approved point of view, id. at 451 (citing Textile Workers Union v. American Thread
Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953)), Douglas does not incorporate the Wyzanski analysis by
reference or refer back to his own rather brief dissenting opinion in Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 465 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Douglas does quote certain salient comments from the Senate report, including language that
suggests that Congress meant to make collective bargaining agreements "valid, binding and enforce-
able." Id. at 454 (quoting S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 17, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.,
supra note 47, at 423). Yet his treatment of other aspects of the legislative records seems almost
cavalier. Thus, he solemnly quotes a colloquoy on the House floor for the proposition that the
statute was meant to authorize the courts to fashion equitable remedies for breach of labor contracts,
Id. at 455-56 (quoting 93 CoNG. REc. 3656-57 (1947)). He fails to note, however, that the House
version of the statute under consideration at the time explicitly made the provisions of Norris-La-
Guardia inapplicable to labor contract enforcement actions, a provision that was dropped during
conference. See infra note 113.
112. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455. In supporting this conclusion, Douglas relied upon the
decision of the conference committee to transfer authority from the Labor Board to the federal
courts to make rules for the enforcement of labor contracts in accordance with the "usual processes
of law." Id. at 452. This aspect of the legislative history offers far stronger support for the power of
the federal courts to make common law than for the proposition that Congress intended to make
arbitration agreements enforceable. See infra notes 253-65.
113. Lincoln Mills, 363 U.S. at 456. Although section 301 was undoubtedly intended to make an
award of damages available in federal court for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, more
than a little ambiguity surrounds the question whether § 301 also authorized federal courts to decree
compliance with such contracts. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 238 (1962), Justice
Black canvassed the history of the statute in some detail in the course of his decision that Congress
had not intended § 301 to override the bar to injunctive relief established in Norris-LaGuardla and
therefore did not contemplate specific enforcement of the labor contract. Black relied upon two
crucial pieces of history. He first noted that the House bill had specifically made the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act inapplicable to actions to enforce labor contracts, while the Senate bill contained no such
exception. Because the Senate's approach prevailed in conference and the exception was deleted
from the statute, Black concluded that Congress had refrained from empowering the federal courts
to grant injunctive relief against strikes in breach of contract. Black's interpretation was later over-
turned in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). For comments
on the decisions, see Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process A Com-
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intention declared with sufficient clarity to make the Norris-LaGuardia
Act inapplicable to union actions to compel arbitration." 4 During the
course of his opinion, Douglas casually described the process by which
the courts were to fashion federal law under section 301, explaining that
the nature of the problem would determine the "range of judicial
inventiveness."' 15
Douglas's vision of section 301 was, in short, rather broad in its com-
pass and rather curt in its expression. Congress had directed the federal
courts to enforce labor contracts, and Douglas was willing to follow that
directive without pausing to consider such niceties as the availability of
ment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE LJ. 1547 (1963); Atleson, The Circle of Boys Markets: A
Comment on Judicial Inventiveness, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 88 (1985).
114. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457-59. Douglas also failed to marshall what support was avail-
able for his claim that Congress intended arbitration agreements to be enforced. The decision of the
conference committee to drop the unfair labor practice provisions from the Senate bill that would
have made such arbitration agreements enforceable in proceedings before the Labor Board offers
compelling support for this conclusion. At the same time the unfair labor practice provisions were
dropped, Congress broadened § 301 by deleting its reference to contracts "concluded as a result of
collective bargaining." Evidently, then, Congress meant to make the arbitration agreement enforce-
able, and meant for the courts to enforce them. See infra note 258.
This evidence of legislative intent does much to solve the problem of equitable enforcement of
arbitration agreements that Douglas faced in Lincoln Mills. As Bickel and Wellington show in their
discussion of Lincoln Mills, the United States Arbitration Act of 1925 declared as a general matter of
policy that executory arbitration agreements were enforceable in federal court and thus reversed Red
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). Although the Act created an exception for
"contracts of employment," Bickel and Wellington argue that the Taft-Hartley Act could be inter-
preted as making the Arbitration Act's policy of full enforcement applicable to arbitration agree-
ments in the employment arena as well. Having overcome the common law rule of unenforceability,
Bickel and Wellington suggest that an adequate basis existed on which to conclude that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was inapplicable to the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. See Bickel &
Wellington, supra note 15, at 10-19.
The union's lawyers offered an alternative solution to the difficulties posed by the anti-arbitration
decision in Red Cross Line and the limited scope of its legislative reversal. They argued, quite sim-
ply, that Red Cross Line was addressed to judicial enforcement of commercial arbitration agree-
ments and had no application to labor arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. Brief for
Petitioner at 27-39, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). For an argument
that relies on this distinction between labor and commercial arbitration in a different context, see
Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statute" When Is Commerical Arbitration an "Ade-
quate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 517-40 (1989).
115. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457. This explicit approval of judicial inventiveness was perhaps
the most controversial aspect of the opinion. Douglas suggested that federal labor statutes would
furnish some substantive law and that the remainder was to be fashioned either by examining the
policy of federal law or by absorbing compatible state law. For expressions of concern about the
consequences of such inventiveness, see Isaacson, Lincoln Mills Revisited: Caution, Judges In-
venting, in PROCEEDINGS OF N.Y.U. TWELFrH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 191 (E. Stein ed.
1959).
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equitable remedies and the common law bar to the enforcement of execu-
tory promises to arbitrate. His dissenting opinion in Westinghouse two
years earlier had accused the majority of "making mountains out of
molehills" in denying standing to a union that sought to enforce the sal-
ary claims of individual members under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. 116 His opinion in Lincoln Mills was plainly meant to reduce such
molehills to what he viewed as their proper size,117 but it did so more by
ignoring doctrinal difficulties rather than by addressing them
forthrightly.
In his dissenting opinion, Frankfurter took full rhetorical advantage of
Douglas's refusal to engage in traditional doctrinal analysis. He began
by restating his conclusion that section 301 dealt solely with matters of
procedure and failed to establish federal substantive rights.1"' Frank-
furter had reached this conclusion two years earlier, after closely review-
ing the statute's legislative history in the Westinghouse case," 9 and
Douglas's abdication had left his analysis virtually unscathed. 120 Conse-
quently, Frankfurter described the majority's finding that section 301
embodied a substantive directive to enforce labor contracts as an act of
judicial "alchemy" engaged in for the purpose of avoiding difficult consti-
tutional problems. 121
Much of the remainder of Frankfurter's opinion was devoted to a simi-
lar attack on the unrestrained character of the majority's analysis. 122
Perhaps its most revealing section, however, was its discussion of the
116. See Westinghouse, 348 U.S. at 465 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
117. It was this reference that Frankfurter mocked in his dissenting opinion, accusing the major-
ity of making section 301 "a mountain instead of a molehill." Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 460, 465
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 460-62 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
119. Westinghouse, 348 U.S. at 441-49, 452-59.
120. Nonetheless, Frankfurter felt obliged to append what he described as the statute's complete
legislative history to his opinion, see Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 485-546 (appendix to opinion of
Frankfurter, J., dissenting), to support his conclusion that section 301 was "plainly procedural." Id.
at 461. Some commentators have been convinced by the appendix that Frankfurter's interpretation
of section 301 was correct. See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction over
Labor Relations: Part 1, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 6, 269 n.188 (1959); Gregory, The Law of the Collec-
tive Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REv. 635, 641 n.23 (1959).
121. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 460, 462.
122. Thus, Frankfurter portrayed Douglas's decision that Norris-LaGuardia did not bar the spe-
cific enforcement of arbitration agreements as one designed to confer on the union an "ad hoc benefit
in a particular case," id. at 462; he scornfully derided Douglas's willingness to cast upon the federal
courts the task of developing an industrial code through the exercise of judicial inventiveness, Id. at
465; and he challenged both Douglas's superficial dismissal of the common law rule denying enforce-
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proper role of the federal courts in disputes over the enforcement of labor
arbitration agreements. Frankfurter made no secret of his view that such
disputes were "ill-suited to judicial intervention." '123 After quoting
Harry Shulman's argument that the courts should stay out of the arbitral
process altogether, 24 Frankfurter argued that the delay necessarily at-
tendant to litigation would preclude the courts from working out solu-
tions to labor strife.125 The courts' inability to deal with such problems
effectively, coupled with their traditional reluctance to undertake tasks of
a non-judicial character, argued for a narrow construction of the scope of
section 301.126
Finally, Frankfurter's conclusion that section 301 does not make fed-
eral substantive law applicable to labor contracts "forced" him to reach
and resolve the question of constitutionality.127 Because he viewed Con-
gress as having made state law applicable to section 301,128 Frankfurter
concluded that actions to enforce labor contracts did not arise under the
laws of the United States within the meaning of article III, section 2 of
ability to executory arbitration agreements and his "glaring ignor[ance]" of the Arbitration Act. Id.
at 466-67.
Douglas refused to rise to the bait. Although he referred to Red Cross Line, see supra note 114, he
avoided the thrust of that opinion by concluding that section 301 was meant to alter that rule by
implication. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456 & n.7. Douglas also refrained from citing the United
States Arbitration Act, despite the fact that, in a companion case to Lincoln Mills, the First Circuit
had relied upon the Act in upholding the specific enforceability of arbitration agreements. See Local
205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 96-97 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd on other
grounds, 353 U.S. 547, 548 (1957). It thus appears that Douglas chose to deal with these matters
superficially and deliberately ignored a range of possible analytical replies to Frankfurter's attack.
123. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 463.
124. Id. at 463 (quoting Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 999, 1024 (1955)).
125. Id. at 463-64.
126. Id. at 464-65.
127. Id. at 469. It seems evident that Frankfurter's analysis of the statute compelled him to
reach the constitutional question. Under Frankfurter's approach, section 301 required the federal
courts to apply state law. At the time, Alabama regarded executory agreements to arbitrate as
unenforceable, in keeping with the common law rule. See Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers' Union,
230 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1956) (collecting authority), rev'd, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Although Frank-
furter's view of section 301 would lead him to conclude that the complaint was legally insufficient, he
could not reach the content of state law without passing on the constitutionality of its incorporation
into the federal statute.
128. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 469. In this conclusion, Frankfurter was widely supported; most
commentators thought state law would apply to actions under section 301. See, e.g., Bickel & Wel-
lington, supra note 15, at 19; Wollett & Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement,
7 STAN. L. REV. 445, 470-71 (1955). Although some lower federal courts agreed, most of the lower
federal courts viewed section 301 as conferring a federal right to contract enforcement. See Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. at 451 n.2 (collecting cases).
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the Constitution.129 Moreover, he concluded that the doctrine of protec-
tive jurisdiction could not save the provision from constitutional
infirmity. 130
E. Lincoln Mills: The Conventional Wisdom
Although the passage of time and the accretion of law has rendered it
virtually irrelevant to the day-to-day administration of labor contracts,
the Douglas-Frankfurter debate remains very much alive. At the time
Lincoln Mills came down, labor law scholars agreed almost unanimously
with Frankfurter's assessment of the legislative history and his conclu-
sion that section 301 failed to establish a federal substantive right to con-
tract enforcement.13 1  Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington took
precisely this view in their influential discussion of the case.132 Echoing
129. Id. at 469-84.
130. Id. at 473-81. In rejecting "protective" jurisdiction as a basis for upholding the constitu-
tionality of section 301, Justice Frankfurter parted company with most of the commentators who
had considered the question. See, eg., Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 157, 189 (1953); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 13 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 216, 224-25 (1948); Wollett & Wellington, supra note 128, at
475-79; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REv. 274,
305 (1948).
Although Lincoln Mills avoided the protective jurisdiction controversy as it applies to section 301,
the same question of federal jurisdiction may arise in connection with the recently enacted Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986. One provision of the Act authorizes fed-
eral courts to hear suits against hospitals by individuals who claim injury resulting from a violation
of the Act and expressly incorporates the "law of the state where the hospital is located" as the body
of applicable substantive law. See 42 U.S.C § 1395dd(d) (Supp. 1986).
131. In a discussion of the provision published shortly after section 301 became law, Professor
Cox anticipated by ten years the dispute in Lincoln Mills. Cox recognized that one could argue that
the statute made labor contracts enforceable as a matter of federal substantive law; nonetheless, he
concluded that it was "probable" that the "sole effect of these provisions is to recognize labor unions
as juristic personalities." See Cox, supra note 130, at 283. Cox based this view on his conclusion
that the legislative history evinced congressional concern with making unions liable in damages for
breach of their contracts and removing the procedural defects that had plagued contract enforce-
ment suits in state courts. Id. at 304. While Cox thought section 301 might survive constitutional
scrutiny as a grant of protective jurisdiction, he was less concerned with the choice of state or federal
law in actions arising under section 301, and the constitutional implications of that choice, than with
the content of the law to be applied. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. Rav.
601 (1956) (noting that Professor Dunlop, his collaborator, was exploring the choice of law ques-
tion); Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1958).
132. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 15. The article, a classic text of labor law and legal
process scholarship, expresses the view that the Court has the power, in appropriate cases, to "rc-
mand" to Congress statutes that, if pressed, the Court would uphold against constitutional chal-
lenge. Section 301 presented just such a case, the authors argue, because Congress focused entirely
on making labor contracts enforceable and did not consider the institutional capability of federal
courts to fashion the necessary body of law. Id. at 22-35. To force legislative reconsideration of this
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the conclusion that Wellington had reached two years earlier,3 3 the two
scholars described Douglas's decision that section 301 contains substan-
tive content as a conclusion that "finds no support in the language of the
statute and insignificant support in the legislative history." '134 Professor
Meltzer135 and an array of commentators who addressed the meaning of
section 301 in the wake of Lincoln Mills reached similar conclusions.136
The leading dissent, and it was only partial, advanced the view that the
Court could legitimately apply federal law in the absence of definitive
evidence that Congress had chosen state law.' 37
question of institutional fitness, Bickel and Wellington argued for some form of jurisdictional dismis-
sal, coupled with a candid exposition of the reasons for the "remand." Id. at 35.
133. In the wake of the Supreme Court's fragmented opinion in Westinghouse Salaried Employ-
ees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), Wellington and Donald Wollett undertook an
exhaustive review of the legislative history of section 301. See Wollett & Wellington, supra note 128,
at 445. They concluded that section 301(a) "merely provides a forum in which actions for breach
may conveniently be brought by parties who might otherwise be hamstrung by procedural obsta-
cles" Id. at 473-74. They also thought the other provisions of section 301 "plainly deal with mat-
ters of procedure." Id. at 473. To their credit, however, Wollett and Wellington worked out in
some detail the implications of a contrary finding that section 301 was intended to create federal
substantive law. Id. at 450-70. The conflict between state and federal courts that would result from
such a finding was said to support their conclusion that section 301 should be read as a directive to
apply state law. Id. at 479.
134. Bickel & Wellington, supra note 15, at 35-36.
135. Like Cox, Professor Meltzer largely eschewed what he described as the temptation to ex-
plore the rival positions in Lincoln Mills, and focused instead on working out the questions of over-
lapping jurisdiction and lawmaking power that the decision presented. See Meltzer, The Supreme
Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations: II, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 276
(1959). Nevertheless, Meltzer described the dominant objective behind section 301 as the elimina-
tion of certain technical obstacles to suits for breach of the labor contract. Id. at 269. In his view,
the legislative history, collected in Frankfurter's dissent, was "persuasive support for a dominantly
jurisdictional interpretation of section 301." Id. at 269 n.188.
136. Early commentary on section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act generally agreed that Congress
had failed to specify the source of applicable law. See Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agree-
ments-A New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1270 (1957) ("The hearings,
debates and reports, by and large, did not reach such a sophisticated level."); Mendelsohn, Enforce-
ability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167, 184 (1956)
(Although the "subject of what Congress intended under section 301 has been argued ad infinitum,
. .. disagreement, doubt and speculation are the only apparent results."); Gregory, The Law of the
Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REv. 635, 637 (1959) ("Congress was not entirely sure what it
meant in section 301 or what its constitutional powers were."). Cf. Forrester, The Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAw & CoNTEM?. PROBS. 114, 119 (1948) (arguing that Con-
gress meant to solve procedural problems that had plagued state court enforcement suits without
addressing the choice of law question). See also Olverson, Collective Bargaining and the Taft-Hart-
Icy Labor Act, 33 VA. L. REv. 549 (1947); Note, Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act: A Constitu-
tional Problem of Federal Jurisdiction, 57 YALE L.J. 630 (1948).
137. See Mendelsohn, supra note 136. While Mendelsohn concluded that the matter was not
free from doubt, he thought Frankfurter overstated his case in ascribing a "wholly jurisdictional"
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The passage of time has not softened the academy's view. Eleven years
after the Lincoln Mills decision, Professor Wellington described it as hav-
ing resolved serious and divisive questions by "judicial fiat."' 38 Welling-
ton continued: "No serious attempt was made by that Court to bridge
with reasoned elaboration the gap between question and conclusion. The
majority opinion is simply an ipse dixit."139 Others continue to share
Wellington's assessment. For example, Professor Stone's lengthy cri-
tique of the Court's jurisprudence describes Lincoln Mills as having read
into section 301 a substantive intent to make labor contracts enforceable
"without any support in the legislative history."" Professor Atleson
perhaps states the prevailing view when he describes the Supreme Court
in Lincoln Mills as having "empowered itself to create section 301
law." 141
purpose to section 301. Id. at 183-84. Essentially, Mendelsohn made a practical argument: since
the legislative history failed to yield any definitive insight into the question whether Congress meant
state or federal law to apply in section 301 actions, the Court was free to make a choice of law
without doing violence to the "obvious design of Congress." Id. at 184 (quoting Westinghouse Sala-
ried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 454 (1955)). Mendelsohn then argued on
practical terms for the application of federal law, either judge-made or statutory, that would supply a
basis for the specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. Id. at 202.
Others agreed with Mendelsohn that Frankfurter had exaggerated his claim that the record was
barren of any evidence that Congress meant the federal courts to apply federal substantive law. See
Cox supra note 130, at 283; Feinsinger, supra note 136, at 1270-71.
Professors Charles Bunn and Charles Gregory advanced the strongest arguments for the substan-
tive character of section 301. Bunn argued in the wake of Lincoln Mills that section 301(a) implied
an intention to make the labor contract binding as a matter of federal law. See Bunn, Lincoln Mills
and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REV. 1247, 1253-56
(1957). He based this argument on the extent of the federal regulation of the collective bargaining
process, the recognition that sponsors of the statute had described it in terms of making the labor
contract binding, and on the view that a statute permitting suits for violation "goes a long way
toward saying 'Such contracts are obligatory.'" Id. at 1256. See also Olverson, supra note 136, at
575-78 (arguing that § 301 should be read as an implicit declaration that labor contracts were en-
forceable as a matter of federal law). Gregory's 1948 labor law casebook argued that section 301
worked a fundamental change in the substantive law of labor contract enforcement, but he appar-
ently retracted that position in later work. See infra note 277.
138. H. WELLINGTON, supra note 74, at 100.
139. Id.
140. Stone, supra note 73, at 1528.
141. Atleson, supra note 113, at 99 (emphasis added). Atleson concludes that the decision in
Boys Markets reveals the costs of judicial inventiveness unguarded by legislative enactments because
it judicially modified the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a statute designed "precisely to restrict judicial
policymaking." Id. at 108. See also St. Antoine, Integrity and Circumspection: The Labor Law
Vision of Bernard D. Meltzer, 53 U. CHn. L. REV. 78, 98 (1986) (Lincoln Mills was a "tour de force"
that upheld the constitutionality of section 301 despite the fact that the statute "in terms had merely
granted jurisdiction to the federal district courts"). For the comments of those outside the labor
field, see supra notes 17-18.
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II. THE SUBsTANTrVE CONTENT OF SECTION 301
A. The Interpretive Task
Lincoln Mills posed a problem in the choice of applicable law. 142Sec-
tion 301(a) declares that "suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization... may be brought in any district court
of the United States," so long as the contract satisfies the commerce test
of the statute. 143 One can certainly read the statute, as Frankfurter did,
to mean that the federal courts merely enjoy jurisdiction over breach of
labor contract claims and must define "violations" of labor contracts by
reference to state law. But one can just as easily interpret this language
to impose a federal obligation on the parties to comply with their labor
contracts. 144 According to such a view, the federal courts would define
the compliance obligation by elaborating the definition of the term "vio-
lation" on a case-by-case basis.
This section of the Article revisits the choice of law question by re-
viewing the structure and history of the statute, the committee reports,
the debates, and other sources that shed light on the statute's meaning.
Most scholars who have undertaken such a review have, pace Frank-
furter, concluded that the legislative history demonstrates a dominantly
procedural focus and, therefore, an expectation that the federal courts
would define labor contract violations in accordance with state law. 145 1
disagree with this conclusion.
Frankfurter's interpretation of section 301 as incorporating state law
would render the statute ineffective and nullify the congressional design.
Congressional dissatisfaction with conflicting state approaches led to the
passage of the statute; if section 301 incorporates those conflicting ap-
proaches, then the statute simply transfers the conflict to the federal fo-
rum."4 More fundamentally, the interpretation of section 301 as
incorporating state law raises the article III problems that Frankfurter
explored in his Lincoln Mills dissent. 47 The ordinary presumption
142. In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S.
437 (1955), Frankfurter states the question quite clearly as involving a choice between reading sec-
tion 301 to authorize "the federal courts to fashion the judicial rules" to govern the collective agree-
ment or reading it to furnish a "federal forum for enforcing the body of contract law which the
States provide." Id. at 442.
143. For the text of section 301(a), see supra note 32.
144. See infra text accompanying notes 187-201.
145. See infra note 187.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 150-80.
147. See supra note 130.
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against adopting an interpretation that poses constitutional difficulties at
least suggests that the Frankfurter school must make a rather clear dem-
onstration that the statute compels the application of state law. 148 In the
case of section 301, however, the presumption takes on additional force
because the problem of the statute's constitutionality was raised during
hearings on the bill by Labor Secretary Lewis Schwellenbach. Senator
Taft answered Schwellenbach's doubts by disavowing Frankfurter's state
law incorporation theory and stating that federal law would control.149
In the sections that follow, this Article demonstrates that Taft's disa-
vowal was not simply an off-the-cuff defense of language that he drafted
and shepherded through Congress, but was consistent with the theory of
the legislation from its origins as section 10 of the Case bill of 1946 to its
passage as section 301 in 1947. This Article first traces the problems
with state court labor contract enforcement proceedings that led to the
passage of the statute. Next it shows that most state courts enforced
labor contracts, if at all, on the theory that they were enforcing the em-
ployment contracts of individual employees. This Article then demon-
strates that section 301 sought to address the problem by transforming
the contract enforcement action from a suit brought to vindicate individ-
ual rights into an action to enforce collective or group interests; the stat-
ute made both unions and employers responsible as entities for
complying with their labor contracts. These substantive changes in labor
contract enforcement theory belie any claim that section 301 incorpo-
rated state law; indeed, the debates over the statute rested on the assump-
tion that "violations" of labor contracts would present a federal question.
B. The Obstacles to Labor Contract Enforcement in State Court
The Senate report recounts the "practical difficulties" with the en-
forcement of labor contracts that led to the passage of section 301.10
The report explains that the Wagner Act had required employers to bar-
gain with unions with a view towards reaching agreement and to reduce
148. Frankfurter acknowledged as much in his Lincoln Mills dissent, admitting that the Court
must read section 301 to "enable it to survive" constitutional scrutiny but concluding that the incor-
poration of state law was too clear for the Court to ignore. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 477-78.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 245-49.
150. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HiST., supra note 47, at 421.
For the history of collective wage determination in the United States, see S. PERLMAN, A HISTORY
OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 4-7 (1929); J. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LABOR 54-58 (1959); Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L.
REV. 829, 832 (1948).
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any agreement to writing.'51 The Wagner Act, however, failed to pro-
vide machinery for the enforcement of such contracts; 152 actions to en-
force a collective bargaining agreement went forward in state court under
ordinary contract principles. 15a The problem with such proceedings, ac-
cording to the Senate report, was that the laws of many states "make it
difficult to sue effectively and to recover a judgment against an unincor-
porated labor union."'t51 Most observers, including Frankfurter, have in-
terpreted the Senate's expression of concern with the "practical"
obstacles to effective contract enforcement as support for the claim that
Congress intended section 301 to solve procedural problems stemming
from the union's status as a voluntary association.' 55 While this interpre-
tation correctly identifies the union's associational status as the source of
the problems that concerned Congress, to label such enforcement difficul-
ties as procedural fundamentally misstates the nature and the extent of
151. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. Hisr., supra
note 47, at 421. The employer's duty to bargain, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX5) (1982) (making it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his
employees), was made binding on unions as well, when Congress added section 8(bX3) to the Labor
Act as part of the Taft-Hartley amendments. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(bX3) (1982). On the duty to
reduce agreements to writing, see H.J. Heinz v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
152. Although the Wagner Act did not by its terms impose an obligation on employers to com-
ply with their collective bargaining agreements, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain uni-
lateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment may violate the employer's duty to
bargain in good faith. See, eg., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). During the consideration of
Taft-Hartley, no one suggested that such a bargaining obligation, standing alone, would adequately
ensure compliance with labor contracts.
153. Congress understood both the obvious point that the Wagner Act had failed to make collec-
tive bargaining agreements enforceable as a matter of federal law and the corollary: actions to en-
force such agreements went forward in state court. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18
(1947), reprinted in I LEGIS. HisT., supra note 47, at 421-24 (noting that no federal statute "makes
unions legally responsible for carrying out their agreements" and cataloging the disparate state court
approaches to the enforcement question). For useful summaries of the range of state court ap-
proaches to the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, see E. DANGEL & I. SHRIBER, THE
LAW OF LABOR UNIONS §§ 305-333 (1941); 1 L. TELLER, THE LAW GOVERNING LABOR DiS-
PUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, §§ 157-60 (1940); Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and
the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 829 (1948); Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective
Contracts in the American Legal System, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1109 (1941); Rice, Collective Labor
Agreements in American Law, 44 HARV. L. REV. 572 (1931); Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements
in the Courts, 48 YALE L.J. 195 (1938); Note, The Present Status of Collective Labor Agreements, 51
HARV. L. REv. 520 (1938).
154. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. Hisr., supra note 47,
at 421.
155. For Frankfurter's view that Congress was concerned with procedural matters, see Associa-
tion of Salaried Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444-49 (1955).
See also Wollett & Wellington, supra note 128, at 473; Miller & Ryza, Suits By and Against Labor
Organizations Under the N.LR.A. 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 101, 103.
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the problems. 56 The union's associational status presented both proce-
dural and substantive obstacles' 57 to the effective state court enforcement
of labor contracts, as a brief review demonstrates.
At common law, unincorporated labor unions were viewed as volun-
tary associations; such associations, in turn, were said to lack the capac-
ity to sue or be sued in their common name.1 58 This absence of what I
will call "litigation capacity" was responsible for a host of difficulties in
suing unions effectively.15 9 In practice, an employer who sought dam-
ages from an unincorporated union was obliged to commence the action
against the members of the union, serve the members with process, estab-
lish the members' liability for the breach in question, and satisfy the
judgment from the members' assets."6° At the time Congress considered
section 301, it clearly recognized that these requirements posed difficult
156. Frankfurter was far too accomplished a jurist to use the labels "substance" and "proce-
dure" as a substitute for the functional analysis of legal problems. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945). He was also aware that the business of defining a union's litigation capacity,
though often described as a procedural matter, included substantive elements. See Busby v. Electric
Utils. Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72, 77 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (union's capacity could
be regarded as substantive determination of status). That Frankfurter adopted a procedural charac-
terization of the practical difficulties confronted by Congress was at least ironic; more likely, his
procedural label was intended to obscure substantive elements of the statute.
157. This Article adopts the substance-procedure dichotomy with some trepidation for the terms
may obscure as much as they illuminate. It's worth noting nonetheless that many aspects of section
301 address matters of substance, such as the rule of agency, the individual's liability, and the
union's representative status. See infra text accompanying notes 207-17. See also Cox, supra note
130, at 283-84 (recognizing substantive elements in the statute); and infra note 277.
158. Early courts and commentators viewed incorporation as a privilege that the state was free
to confer or withhold; under this conception, corporate personality was conferred, along with the
corporate charter, as a matter of legislative grace. See Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29
HARv. L. REv. 404, 406 (1916). Having failed to obtain such a charter, voluntary associations were
said to lack any legal status or personality apart from their members and were thus denied capacity
to litigate in their common name. See Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng's v. Green, 206 Ala. 196,
89 So. 435 (1921); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers, 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877
(1905); Wilson v. Airline Coal Co., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N.W. 753 (1932); Citizens Co. v. Asheville
Typographical Union, 187 N.C. 42, 121 S.E. 31 (1924); Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men, 271 Pa. 419, 114 A. 377 (1921). See generally Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to
Actions, 33 YALE L.. 383 (1924).
159. Most of the difficulties surfaced in actions seeking legal relief, such as damages. Bills stat-
ing claims by or against unincorporated associations were proper in equity when the claim affected
all the members in common, the members were too numerous to join individually, and the members
named in the bill would adequately represent the interests of the entire membership. See United
Brotherhood of Maintenance v. Kennedy, 13 Del. Ch. 106, 115 A. 587 (1922); Guilfoil v. Arthur,
158 Ill. 600, 41 N.E. 1009 (1895); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906); St. Germain
v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, 97 Wash. 282, 166 P. 665 (1917).
160. See generally E. DANGEL & I. SHPBER, supra note 153, at §§ 455, 466, 470; 1 L. TELLER,
supra note 153.
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hurdles.16 Some states had worked around the problem by passing com-
mon name statutes that authorized suits against the entity. 62 A few ju-
risdictions vitiated the common law rule by decision.1 63 But many did
161. The Senate report specifically highlighted problems with service of process, proof of liabil-
ity, and recovery of judgments in its catalog of state court enforcement difficulties. See S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. Hsr., supra note 47, at 421-24. A
number of labor lawyers had proposed legislation to cure the problems of state court labor contract
enforcement. See, eg., J. SEIDMAN, UNION RIGHTS AND UNION DUTIES 200-01 (1943) (proposing
voluntary registration of enforceable agreements with appropriate agency); L. TELLER, A LABOR
POLICY FOR AMERICA: A NATIONAL LABOR CODE 170.71 (1945) (proposing that breach of con-
tracts be defined as unfair labor practices). Cf. H. METz, LABOR POLICY OF FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT 83 (1945) (noting problems with state court proceedings but suggesting that federal
government was powerless to intervene in contract enforcement issues).
162. Section 301(a) was debated on the assumption that 35 of the 48 states had, either by statute
or decision, vitiated the common law rule denying litigation capacity to unions. See infra note 242.
Most of the early statutes authorized persons who were associated together and known by some
distinguishing name to sue and be sued in the common name. For a representative sample of early
decisions applying such statutes to trade unions, see Armstrong v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. 341, 159
P. 1176 (1916); Vance v. McGinley, 39 Mont. 46, 101 P. 247 (1909); Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-
cutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 A. 492 (1890). Some of the early "common name" statutes were
directed specifically at persons who associated together to transact business in a common name;
courts occasionally held that such statutes were inapplicable to unions organized to promote the
welfare of their members. See St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union, 94 Minn. 351
102 N.W. 725 (1905). But see Taylor v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 89 Minn. 222, 94 N.W. 684
(1903) (union that had established a mutual benefit department to provide life insurance to members
was engaged in business for purposes of suit in its common name).
163. Although the Supreme Court held as early as 1922 that unions were subject to suit as
entities in federal court, at least as to matters on which federal law supplied the rule of decision, see
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 392 (1922), state courts by and large
continued to deny litigation capacity to associations in the absence of a statute. See Lenhoff, The
Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1109, 1118
n.30 (1941) (collecting cases); Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated
Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40, 42 n.9 (1941). For the exceptional case, see Busby v. Electrical Utils.
Employees Union, 147 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (recognizing union's litigation capacity within the
District of Columbia by judicial decision).
Even the Court's subsequent decisions limited the reach of Coronado to cases in which the associa-
tion's existence was recognized in a federal statute. Compare Moffat Tunnel League v. United
States, 289 U.S. 113 (1933) (associations have no capacity to sue unless so authorized by statute)
with Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928) (implicit authority to sue an association found in
the federal antitrust laws). See generally 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1564, at 462 (1990). This limited view of the Coronado decision was incor-
porated into the original version of Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took
effect in 1938. Rule 17(b) provides that the capacity of unincorporated associations to sue and be
sued "shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held, except that...
[an] unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may sue or be
sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing
under the Constitution or laws of the United States." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b). The advisory commit-
tee notes suggest that the rule simply follows existing law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) advisory
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nothing. 164
The common law view of unions as voluntary associations also affected
the theory by which state courts enforced labor contracts. Voluntary
associations were said to lack the capacity to enter into binding con-
tracts.165 This lack of what I will call "contractual capacity," to distin-
guish it from litigation capacity, meant that collective bargaining
agreements were regarded in the early years of the century as "gen-
tleman's agreements"; 166 the parties might voluntarily agree to respect
their terms but such contracts did not give rise to legally enforceable
rights. 167  The only enforceable agreements in the workplace were the
individual contracts of hire between the firm and the individual
employees. 168
committee note ("[t]his rule follows existing law as to such associations, as declared in [Coronado
Coall").
164. The states that failed to act included Illinois and other important industrial states.
165. See, eg., Lamm v. Stoen, 226 Iowa 622, 284 N.W. 485 (1939). That the common law
denied voluntary associations the capacity to enter into contracts in their common name was occa-
sionally noted in passing, see, eg., A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 F. 225 (6th Cir. 1909), but one
struggles to find decisions that state precisely that point in connection with suits to enforce terms
contained in the collective bargaining agreement. The dearth of opinions undoubtedly stems from
the fact that the association's well-known lack of contractual and litigation capacity prevented the
union from seeking enforcement of contract terms directly. See Rentschler v. Missouri P. R. Co.,
126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934) (noting that because unions were not incorporated and thus
lacked capacity to contract, collective bargaining agreements in the United States were not regarded
as contracts and few attempts were made to enforce them). Instead, unions and their officers pur-
ported to act as agents in negotiating contracts that would govern the terms of employment of
individual employees. Thus, early suits to enforce the terms in the collective agreement were
brought by individual employees.
166. J. COMMONS & J. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 118 (1916) ("The so-
called 'contract' which a trade union makes with an employer or employers' association is merely a
'gentlemen's agreement,' a mutual understanding, not enforceable against anybody. It is an under-
standing that, when the real labor contract is made between the individual employer and the individ-
ual employee, it shall be made according to the terms previously agreed upon. But there is no legal
penalty if the individual contract is made differently. To enforce the collective contract would be to
deny the individual's liberty to make his own contract.").
167. Many early courts held that the collective contract was simply irrelevant to the individual
terms of employment. See Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S.W. 136 (1904). Such
decisions rested on the view that allowing the union a role in negotiation would interfere with the
individual's liberty of contract. See Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract,
48 COLUM. L. REv. 829, 829-31 (1948). See also supra note 166.
168. The relationship between the individual contract of hire and the collective bargaining agree-
ment has continued to pose difficult problems of contract administration under the Labor Act. The
Supreme Court held in J.I. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944), that an employer could not assert
the existence of individual contracts of hire, which established terms of employment for a stated
term, as a bar to its obligation to bargain collectively with its employees' chosen representative. But
the J.L Case decision does not absolutely preclude the enforcement of rights under an individual
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As the century wore on and collective bargaining became more com-
mon, many states increasingly came to recognize the legal significance of
the collective bargaining agreement in the enforcement of individual la-
bor contracts.1 69 Using a variety of theories, state courts held that indi-
vidual contracts incorporated the terms of the collective agreement.
Some treated the collective bargain as a custom or usage that was incor-
porated in the individual contract; 7 ' others regarded the employees as
third-party beneficiaries of the union's contract; x71 still others viewed the
union as the employees' contracting agent.17 2  Eventually, some state
courts, notably those in New York, simply held that the collective bar-
gaining agreement established mutual obligations that were enforceable
by and against the employer and the union in suits at law and in
equity. 17 3
contract by members of a bargaining unit. Thus, in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386
(1987), the Court held that the employer had wrongly removed to federal court an action in which
an employee sought to assert state law rights under an individual contract of hire. The Court's
opinion suggests that federal law may leave some room for the enforcement of such rights in state
courts. See also Berda v. CBS, Inc., 881 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1989) (no preemption of individual con-
tract claim).
169. For a discussion of this evolutionary process, see supra note 153.
170. See, eg., Hudson v. Cincinnati Ry., 152 Ky. 711, 717, 154 S.W. 47,49 (1913); Langmade v.
Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N.Y.S. 388 (1910); Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault,
157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W.2d 692 (1928).
171. See Gulla v. Barton, 164 A.D. 293, 294, 149 N.Y.S. 952, 953 (N.Y. App. Div. 1924); H.
Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 427, 155 N.E. 154, 155 (1926); Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v.
Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 14, 133 So. 669, 672 (1931). The advantage of this third party theory was
that it permitted the courts to afford recovery to employees who worked in ignorance of the advanta-
geous collective agreement; its drawback was that it failed to provide a basis on which the employer
could hold individual employees responsible for breach of the collective agreement. See Rice, supra
note 153, at 595-96. Moreover, it failed to admit the possibility that the union might agree to modify
the collective agreement in a manner inconsistent with the theoretically vested rights of the individ-
ual beneficiaries. See Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923).
Eventually, courts came to accept the view that the union makes the contract for the employee and
retains control over its terms. See Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 173, 188 N.E. 705, 707
(1934); Hartley v. Brotherhood, 283 Mich. 201, 206, 277 N.W. 885, 885 (1938).
172. See A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 F. 225, 229 (6th Cir. 1909); Maisel v. Sigman, 123
Misc. 714, 719, 205 N.Y.S. 807, 811 (1924).
173. New York generally recognized the employer's right to enjoin the union from breaching its
contractual no-strike clause, see Greater City Master Plumbers Ass'n v. Kahme, 6 N.Y.S.2d 589,
592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937), as well as the union's right to enjoin the employer from breaching either
its obligation to hire union members, see Suttin v. Unity Button Works, 144 Misc. 784, 786, 258
N.Y.S. 863, 864, aff'd 236 A.D. 792, 258 N.Y.S. 1049 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932), or its obligation to
refrain from locking out its employees. See Goldman v. Cohen, 222 A.D. 631, 633, 227 N.Y.S. 311,
313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). In addition, New York recognized the right of both the union and the
employee to recover damages for the employer's breach of contract. See Barth v. Addie Co., 271
N.Y. 31, 2 N.E.2d 34 (1936) (permitting individual to sue on his own behalf for severance pay due
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Despite these developments in New York and their modest influence
on the law of other states, 74 the collective theory of labor contract en-
forcement was by no means universally accepted at the time Congress
addressed the question of labor contract enforcement in 1946.175 Some
state court decisions from the 1930s and 1940s describe the collective
bargaining agreement as "the joint and several contract of the members
of the union, made by the officers of the union as their agents." '176 Other
courts viewed the contract as binding, not on its own terms, but became
binding when it was adopted as part of the individual contract of each
employee. 177 As a consequence, many actions seeking to enforce con-
under the contract, and permitting union to intervene to recover wages on behalf of employees
whose wages were reduced below the level set forth in the collective bargain).
Even in New York, however, problems remained. In actions for damages, the New York courts
continued to require evidence that established the substantive liability of all of the members of the
association. See, e.g., J. Friedman & Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 115 Misc. 44, 54, 188
N.Y.S. 879, 885 (1921). See also Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N.Y. 225, 232, 109 N.E. 244, 246 (1915)
(requiring employer to show that each member authorized or ratified the breach of contract).
174. In Harper v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932),
the Texas intermediate appellate court relied extensively on New York decisions in affirming the
issuance of an injunction directing an employer to comply with the closed shop agreement in the
labor contract. IM. at 1040-41. Significantly, the court regarded its decision as having brought Texas
within a limited number of jurisdictions that viewed the collective agreement as not only giving rise
to individual rights in union members but also establishing a contract "between the organization or
group as such and the employer." Id. at 1040 (emphasis added). See also Weber v. Nasser, 286 P.
1074 (Cal. App. 1930).
175. Courts that denied unions standing to enforce the rights of individuals generally divided up
the terms of the collective agreement into provisions that were intended to benefit the members as a
whole and were, therefore, enforceable at the union's behest, and those that created peculiarly indi-
vidual rights, enforceable at the instance of the individual employees alone. Thus, unions were per-
mitted to enforce the employer's promise to hire only union members, but were not permitted to
bring suit on behalf of individuals who were wrongfully discharged in violation of the collective
bargain. See Christiansen v. Local 680, Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, 126 N.J. Eq. 508, 513-14,
10 A.2d 168, 171 (1940) (although the unjustifiable discharge of four employees may "give them a
cause of action on the [collective] contract, it is a cause solely between them and [the employer] and
not between the members of the Union collectively and [the employer]"). See also Schwartz v. Cigar
Makers' Int'l Union, 219 Mich. 589, 189 N.W. 55 (1922). But see Barth v. Addie Co., 271 N.Y. 31,
2 N.E.2d 34 (1936) (union permitted to recover difference between wages paid and amounts set forth
in labor contract on behalf of affected members); Textile Workers Union v. Textron, Inc., 99 N.H.
385, 111 A.2d 823 (1955) (recognizing union's standing to enforce individual rights).
176. Christiansen, 126 N.J. Eq. at 512, 10 A.2d at 171.
177. Many courts thus theorized that, in itself, the collective contract was incomplete in that it
established no contract between the employer and individttal employees. Since the employer re-
mained free to hire and discharge and the employees remained free to work or quit, the collective
bargain did not conclude the contract. Rather, in the words of one court, the collective contract was
"a mutual general offer, to be closed by specific acceptance." Rentschler v. Missouri P. Ry., 126
Neb. 493, 501, 253 N.W. 694, 698 (1934). Accord Hall v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 224 Mo. App. 431, 28
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tract rights and obligations were brought by17 and against179 the individ-
ual employee. Even in states that afforded unions the capacity to sue,
courts frequently denied unions standing to enforce the rights of individ-
ual members.1 80
In sum, the union's status as a voluntary association presented a host
of practical obstacles to effective state court enforcement of labor con-
tracts. While certain of these difficulties can be described as procedural,
the problems ran much deeper. With but a few exceptions, state courts
failed to recognize the collective bargaining agreement as creating legal
rights enforceable by and against the union as a collectivity. Instead, the
states struggled to enforce the collective agreement by reference to the
employment contracts between the firm and the individual employee.
C. The Language, Structure, and History of Section 301:
Implementing A Collective Theory of Labor Contract
Enforcement
Section 301 rejects the state model of labor contract enforcement, with
its emphasis on individual contracts of hire, and adopts the modem view
that labor contracts established rights enforceable by and against unions
on a collective or corporate basis. 1" Senator Taft made no secret of this
purpose in his discussions of the statute, explaining that the statute was
designed to make unions responsible for their breaches of labor contracts
on a collective basis." 2 Nor did Taft disguise the fact that federal law
would govern the enforcement of labor contracts under section 301.
Statements that appear in the Senate reports and Taft's comments during
debates on the statute both reflect the understanding that an action to
enforce collective bargaining agreements under section 301 would pres-
ent a federal question.1 13
SMW.2d 687 (1930); Brisbin v. E.L. Oliver Lodge No. 335, Bro. of Ry. Clerks, 134 Neb. 517, 529, 279
NW. 277 (1938). See generally E. DANGEL & I. SHRIBER, supra note 153, § 305, at 334.
178. See, e.g., Hall v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 224 Mo. App. 431, 28 S.W.2d 687 (1930) (action by
individual for wrongful discharge); Christiansen v. Local 680, Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, 126
N.J. Eq. 508, 10 A.2d 168 (1940) (action by individual seeking severance pay); Rentschler v. Mis-
souri P. Ry., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934) (action by individual to recover wages due under
the collective agreement).
179. See Whiting Milk Cos. v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N.E. 379 (1933) (action by employer
against former employee to enforce non-compete clause in collective contract).
180. See supra note 175.
181. See supra note 153.
182. See infra note 204.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 235-49.
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This section of the Article collects evidence from the language, struc-
ture, and history of the statute that corroborates Taft's claim that the
statute was intended to establish federal rights. I begin with section
301(a), and attempt to show that the language of the statute, though ad-
mittedly ambiguous, can readily be interpreted as establishing a federal
duty to comply with labor contracts. The remaining sections contain ad-
ditional evidence that supports such a substantive interpretation of sec-
tion 301(a). I begin with supplemental provisions of section 301 that
were evidently designed to supercede conflicting provisions of state law
by establishing federal substantive rules to govern labor contract claims.
I next consider structural evidence that Congress drafted these internal
provisions on the assumption that federal law would control under sec-
tion 301(a). Finally, I collect statements from the committee reports and
debates, all of which confirm the federal content of section 301.
1. Section 301(a): A Substantive Interpretation
The linchpin of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Lincoln Mills was his
claim that although the language of section 30 1(a) confers jurisdiction on
the federal courts to hear actions for breach of labor contracts, it fails to
declare such contracts to be enforceable as a matter of federal law. 184 He
thus concluded that the statute merely provides a federal forum in which
to hear contract disputes, but leaves the federal courts to determine the
question of enforceability in accordance with state law.185 Much of the
remainder of his legislative history analysis simply seeks to buttress his
claim that Congress focused on matters of procedure rather than of sub-
stance. 186 Although many commentators have agreed with Frankfurter's
184. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437, 443-44 (1955) (the language of the statute fails to suggest "general application of any
defined or theretofore available federal substantive law" and thus supports a procedural
interpretation).
185. To Frankfurter, both the language and history supported the interpretation of the statute as
a "mere procedural provision." Id. at 444, 449. See also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 461 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) ("plainly procedural"). It thus supplied a federal forum for suits on contracts
based on state law. Id. at 448.
186. Frankfurter's only detailed review of the language and history of section 301 appeared in
his plurality opinion in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), a discussion he later referred to in Lincoln Mills. After reviewing the
language of section 301, which he described as suggesting a merely jurisdictional focus, Frankfurter
undertook a lengthy analysis of the legislative history. Id. at 444-49. The burden of this analysis
was to establish that section 301 had begun life in the House as a substantive provision but had been
transformed into a merely jurisdictional provision on the Senate side. Frankfurter argued that Sena-
tor Taft viewed collective agreements as enforceable under state law and took steps to solve the
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claim, 187 the language of the statute does not compel a merely jurisdic-
tional interpretation. By its terms, section 301 declares that "[s]uits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization...
may be brought in any district court," so long as the contract satisfies the
commerce test of the statute."I One can certainly interpret this language
to impose a federal obligation on the parties to comply with their labor
contracts. After all, the statute makes a "violation" of labor contracts
actionable in federal court.18 9 It thus obliges the parties to comply with
their contracts or face an action for breach.
Those who have accepted Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of sec-
tion 301(a) regard the statute as "wholly jurisdictional." They reason
that the statute both fails to declare in so many words that it shall be
unlawful for the parties involved to violate their promises,'I and fails to
practical difficulties with their enforcement by making unions subject to suit as entities. Id. at 445-
46. He also set forth the minority view of the statute as one providing a forum for the enforcement
of state law and argued that Taft failed to dispute this interpretation or justify the statute as depen-
dent on federal substantive law. Id. at 448-49.
187. Although many commentators have associated themselves with Frankfurter's reading of
section 301, relatively few have conducted detailed assessments of the language of the statute. For
the most part, however, those assessments agree with that of Frankfurter. See Miller & Ryza, supra
note 155, at 103; Wollett & Wellington, supra note 128, at 473-74. But see Bunn, supra note 137, at
1253-56 (arguing that permitting suits for violations of contracts was tantamount to a declaration of
their binding character); Note, Section 301(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act: A Constitutional Problem of
Federal Jurisdiction, 57 YALE L.J. 630 (1948) (arguing that section 301 could be read as making
labor contracts enforceable as a matter of federal law).
188. See supra note 32 (quoting section 301(a)) (emphasis added).
189. The substantive flavor of section 301(a)'s reference to violations of labor contracts thus
distinguishes the statute from other provisions of federal law that merely confer jurisdiction upon the
federal courts. Se eg., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (jurisdiction of civil actions "arising under" the Constitu-
tion, law or treaties of the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (jurisdiction of any civil case of "admi-
ralty or maritime jurisdiction"); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (jurisdiction of civil actions arising under any
"Act of Congress" relating to patents, copyrights and trade-marks).
190. Two labor practitioners, Edward Miller and Willis Ryza, noted the absence of any declara-
tion of a federal substantive right to contract enforcement in the statute and proceeded to analyze
the constitutional issues with some care. See Miller & Ryza, supra note 155. They noted, for exam-
ple, that the Senate bill had defined breach of the labor contract as an unfair labor practice, and
suggested that such a definition would suffice as establishing the missing rule of substantive law. Id.
at 102-03. They suggested that it was the failure of Congress to include a similar provision in the
statute that emerged from the conference that raised constitutional difficulties. Id.
To the extent that Miller and Ryza were arguing that Congress had inadvertantly omitted the
substantive declaration from the Act, their claim cannot be sustained. Section 301 had its genesis as
section 10(a) of the Case bill, and its terms were substantially identical to those of the statute ulti-
mately enacted. The 79th Congress clearly understood that the Case bill provisions had established
federal substantive law; it had been debated on those terms. Moreover, the Case bill did not contain
any provision making contract breaches an unfair labor practice. In short, Congress regarded the
precursor to section 301(a) itself as an adequate declaration of the federal enforceability of labor
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establish federal standards by which to determine whether a violation has
occurred.19' Professors Wollett and Wellington, for example, contrast
the "jurisdictional" language of section 301(a) with what they describe as
the "plainly substantive" language of section 303(a), t92 which declared
that "[it shall be unlawful" for labor organizations to engage in secon-
dary boycotts and other specified conduct that was also declared unlaw-
ful in unfair labor practice provisions in section 8(b) of the Act. 193
Wollett and Wellington thus attribute significance to the fact that, unlike
section 301(a), section 303(a) contains both a declaration that makes cer-
tain union conduct illegal as a matter of federal law and establishes a
federal standard by which to assess the legality of that conduct.
The failure of section 301(a) to declare specifically that a breach of
contract violates federal law, however, does not render the provision
"wholly jurisdictional." A separate declaration of illegality was simply
unnecessary. The statute opens the federal forum only to parties that
allege a violation of a labor contract; it thus accomplishes precisely the
same result as would a hypothetical two-part statute that initially de-
clared it unlawful to violate labor contracts and then provided a federal
forum to hear such claims.' 94 Under either approach, the statute would
contracts. The addition, and subsequent deletion, of the provision for Labor Board enforcement of
such contracts was a separate matter.
191. Professors Wollett and Wellington, for example, describe the provision as "merely
provid[ing] a forum" because it fails to declare that violating one's collective bargaining agreements
is unlawful. See Wollett & Wellington, supra note 128, at 474. See also Bickel & Wellington, supra
note 15, at 36 (a substantive interpretation of section 301 "finds no support in the language of the
statute and insignificant support in the legislative history"); Miller & Ryza, supra note 155, at 103
(the failure of Congress to declare violations of the labor contract unlawful raises interpretive
questions).
192. See Wollett & Wellington, supra note 128, at 473-74; Miller & Ryza, supra note 155, at 104.
193. Section 303(a) declared as unlawful a long list of union practices such as secondary boycotts
and jurisdictional disputes that were also made unfair labor practices in section 8(b) of the Labor
Act. Section 303(b) affords those injured a right of action for damages in federal court. See § 303,
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 158, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 187
(1982)). After amendments to the statute that were enacted as part of the Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, the statute simply incorporated by reference
the declaration of illegality in section 8(b)(4). See generally 2 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1178-1187 (2d ed.
1983).
194. Consider a hypothetical statute drafted to include an express declaration and a jurisdic-
tional provision:
(a) It shall be unlawful for either party to violate contracts between an employer and a
labor organization that represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this Act.
(b) Suits for violation of subsection (a) may be brought in any district court of the
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make violations of labor contracts that affect interstate commerce action-
able in federal court.
Nor does the statute's failure to set forth standards for determining a
"violation" of the labor contract render section 301(a) merely jurisdic-
tional. Although section 303(a) contains more substantive content than
section 30 1(a),195 the contrast between the language of the two provisions
ultimately proves nothing. Section 303 imposes federal tort liability on
unions that engage in certain unlawful conduct and provides for recovery
of damages by any person "injured in his business or property" by such
misconduct. 19 6 It was essential to the federal scheme that the statute
actually describe the unlawful conduct; otherwise, no text would define
the scope and nature of this newly created, federal obligation of labor
organizations. In the labor contract arena, however, Congress sought to
accomplish nothing more than to impose a federal obligation on the par-
ties to comply with the terms of their collective bargain. The scope and
nature of the obligations of the parties were understood to be those set
forth in the agreement, and the federal courts were simply expected to
enforce the bargain.1 97
In other words, the cause of action created by section 301(a) was
based, not on an independent description of conduct made illegal by fed-
eral law, but on the existence of a labor contract that was itself a creature
of federal law.198 The Wagner Act already required employers to negoti-
ate in good faith with a view towards reaching a collective bargaining
agreement and to reduce the resulting accord to writing. 199 The Taft-
Hartley Act had added an unfair labor practice provision that imposed
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Such a statute would have supplied the substantive declaration that section 301(a) lacks according to
the Frankfurter school. But surely one can fairly read § 301(a), which essentially boils this two-part
statute down into a single provision, to accomplish the same end.
195. As initially enacted, see supra note 193, section 303(a) declared it to be unlawful for unions
to engage in a strike or work stoppage for the purpose of forcing any person to recognize the union,
to cease handling the products of or doing business with other firms, and to make particular assign-
ments of work. It thus defined an array of unlawful union conduct.
196. See supra note 193.
197. For Senator Taft's description of the statute along these lines, see infra notes 248-249.
198. Justice Douglas made a similar argument in suggesting that the federal control over the
collective bargaining process might establish sufficient substantive content to authorize enforcement
of collective agreements as a matter of federal law, even without any explicit declaration to that
effect. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S.
437, 465-67 (1955) (Douglas J., dissenting). See also Bunn, supra note 137, at 1254-56.
199. See supra note 151.
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
292 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
this bargaining duty on unions, as well as employers.2 "o Once the agree-
ment was reached, section 301(a) compelled the parties as a matter of
federal law to comply with its terms.20 1 It was entirely natural for Con-
gress to express this compliance obligation in section 301(a) by simply
stating that a "violation" of the labor contract by either party was action-
able in federal court.
2. The Supplemental Provisions of Section 301
Section 301 did more than simply declare that federal courts may hear
suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements; it also included a
number of supplemental provisions designed to make this newly created
federal claim effective. While some of these supplemental provisions ad-
dressed matters of procedure, such as the manner of serving the union
with process and the proper venue of the action,20 2 most of them estab-
lished federal substantive rules that implemented a collective theory of
labor contract enforcement and modified the model of labor contract en-
forcement then prevailing in many state courts.20 3 As Senator Taft ex-
plained, the statute was intended to make unions liable for labor
contracts "as if they were corporations. ' '204
The statute accomplished this result by: declaring that violations of
labor contracts were actionable in federal court;205 declaring that the
union could sue and be sued as an entity;206 opening the union's treasury
200. See Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(b)(3), 49 Stat. 452 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3) (1982)).
201. See Section 301(b) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982)).
202. Section 301(c) makes venue of actions and proceedings by and against labor organizations
proper in the district where the labor organization maintains its principal office and in any district
where the organization, through agents, performs representational services for employees and mem-
bers. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) (1982). Section 301(d) authorizes service of process on the labor organ-
ization by service on an officer or agent of the organization in his capacity as such. See id. at
§ 185(d).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 150-80.
204. See 93 CONG. REc. 3839 (1947) ("the pending bill provides [that unions] can be sued as if
they were corporations"). Taft had made precisely the same point one year earlier during debate on
the precursor to section 301. Taft explained that Senator Byrd had proposed to require all labor
unions to incorporate, a proposal the committee members supporting the Taft approach had rejected
as "awkward [and] unnecessary." 92 CONG. REc. 5705 (1946) (statement of Sen. Taft). He next
explained that his approach was meant to make unions "in effect... suable as if they were corpora-
tions." Id. On the drive for incorporation of labor unions, see supra note 69.
205. See § 301(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982)).
206. Section 301(b) provides that a labor organization may "sue and be sued as an entity and on
behalf of the employees whom it represents." 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982).
[Vol. 69:243
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to claims for damages;20 7 and holding the union responsible for the ac-
tions of its agents.208 Perhaps most significant was the provision immu-
nizing union members from actions to collect judgments against their
union. Section 301(b) provides that any judgment against a labor organi-
zation shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and
"'shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets." 2"
The immunity provision was intended to prevent a recurrence of the re-
sult in the Danbury Hatters case, in which individual union members lost
their homes to satisfy a federal antitrust judgment.210 In reversing the
common law approach to union member liability, section 301(b)'s immu-
nity rule reflects the view that the members' liability, like that of the
shareholders of a corporation, should be limited to the assets that they
committed to the joint enterprise.21
207. Section 301(b) provides that a "money judgment against a labor organization in a district
court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity." Id. at
§ 185(b).
208. Section 301(b) declares that any "labor organization which represents employees in an in-
dustry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter... shall be bound by the acts of its agents." Id.
at § 185(b). Section 301(e) makes clear that in determining "whether any person is acting as an
.agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of
whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be
controlling." Id. at § 185(e).
The agency provision incorporated the "ordinary doctrines of agency" into federal law and made
them applicable to the union as a legal entity separate from its members. United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736 (1966). The statute thus accomplished two purposes. It vitiated the rule in
section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982), which immunized the union from
liability for unlawful conduct in the absence of "clear proof of actual participation in, or actual
authorization of,.. .or of ratification of" unlawful acts by agents or officers of the union. See
Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 217 n.6 (1979). It also altered the rule,
which some state courts followed in actions to enforce labor contracts, see supra note 207, that
precluded enforcement of a judgment against the union in the absence of evidence that each member
had authorized or ratified the breach of contract.
Plainly, the agency rules were consistent with Taft's corporate theory of union responsibility and
he described them in those terms. See 93 CONG. REC. 4022 (1947) (there must be legal proof of
agency in the case of unions "as in the case of corporations"). That the agency rules were intended
to supplement a federal theory of contract enforcement, however, was not fully appreciated by the
commentators. See Miller & Ryza, supra note 155, at 106 (rejecting argument that an agency provi-
sion that merely altered rules prevailing under the Norris-LaGuardia Act had created a "new sub-
stantive right"); Cox, supra note 130, at 305.
209. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982).
210. See Savings Bank of Danbury v. Loewe, 242 U.S. 357 (1917); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S.
522 (1915); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). The Supreme Court has consistently recognized
this purpose of Congress in its interpretion of the scope of the immunity in section 301(b). See
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248 (1962); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451
U.S. 401, 406-07 (1981).
211. Taft explicitly linked his corporate theory of union responsibility to the immunity rule of
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In addition, the statute specifically addresses the capacity of the union
to sue or be sued in federal court.2 12 Although the passage of a such rule
may initially appear to have been unnecessary in light of Rule 17(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,213 a careful review of the language
of the provision discloses why Congress included a capacity rule specifi-
cally tailored to the enforcement of labor contracts. Section 301(b) went
beyond a simple declaration that unions may be sued; it specifically pro-
vided that unions may sue or be sued as an entity "and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents."2 4 In other words, the capacity rule es-
tablishes a federal basis on which the union may bring actions to enforce
the rights of individual employees under the collective bargaining agree-
ment.2" 5 Section 301(b) thus makes clear that the union's role in enforc-
section 301(b). See 92 CONG. REc. 5705 (1946) ("Therefore, we provide very simply that a labor
union may be sued as if it were a corporation, and if it is sued, then the funds of the labor organiza-
tion and its assets are responsible for the judgment, but the funds and the assets of the individual
members are not liable on such a judgment.").
212. Virtually every commentator regarded the capacity provision as establishing a wholly pro-
cedural rule. See Wollett & Wellington, supra note 128, at 471; Miller & Ryza, supra note 155, at
106; Cox, supra note 130, at 305 (by implication). But see C. GREGORY & H. KATz, LAnOR LAW:
CASES, MATERLms AND COMMENTS 1179 (1948) (describing as substantive the statute's declaration
that unions may sue on behalf of their employees). In doing so, they simply overlooked the fact that
the statute does more than accord unions the capacity to litigate.
213. The creation of a federal right to contract enforcement in section 301(a) would appear to
supply the federal substantive law that would trigger application of the federal capacity rule in Rule
17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra note 163. On this view, which Miller and
Ryza specifically adopted, see Miller & Ryza, supra note 155, at 106 & n.24, a federal capacity rule
would appear superfluous. As the text makes clear, however, section 301(b) did more than grant
unions the capacity they would enjoy under Rule 17(b).
214. See supra note 32.
215. Because the language of section 301(b) 'appeared expressly to recognize a union's federal
right to enforce the labor contract on behalf of its members, it seems astonishing that neither Frank-
furter's plurality opinion nor Douglas's dissent in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), referred to the provision. Westinghouse, after all,
presented the question whether a union could recover on behalf of 4000 employees a day's wages
that the employer allegedly withheld in violation of the contract. The lower court's decision, that
section 301 failed to make a union's action to enforce uniquely personal rights of individual employ-
ees cognizable in federal court, adopted a view of the collective bargaining agreement very much in
keeping with the approach of the state courts. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623, 627 (3d Cir. 1954) (wage provisions of collective agree-
ment were not enforceable until they were incorporated into workers' individual contracts of em-
ployment). It was precisely this preoccupation with individual employment contracts that section
301 had been passed to alter. Indeed, when the Supreme Court finally overruled the holding in
Westinghouse that federal courts lack power to entertain the union's suit to enforce individual rights,
it specifically cited section 301(b) as support for its decision. See United Auto. Workers v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 700 (1966).
For early discussions recognizing the significance of the language of section 301(b) in resolving the
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ing the labor contract was to be exactly the same as its role in bargaining
with the employer over the terms of the contract: it was to act as an
entity in representing the interests of employees in the bargaining unit.
The provisions of section 301 that implemented Taft's corporate the-
ory of union responsibility represent a significant departure from the
rules that governed the union's liability in state court enforcement ac-
tions. Unlike many states that refused to permit the union to enforce
contract provisions that were viewed as creating individual employee
rights,216 the federal capacity provision of section 301(b) authorized the
union to enforce individual rights under the collective bargain as the rep-
resentative of the employees. Unlike the states, including New York,
that based liability for breach of labor contracts on a showing that each
individual member had authorized or ratified the breach,217 the agency
rules of section 301(b) and the provision for the collection of judgments
from the union's treasury made the union responsible as an entity for
compliance with the contract. In other words, section 301 ended the
preoccupation in such enforcement suits with the individual employment
contracts and focused on the contract's enforcement by and against the
union as an entity. By effecting these important changes in the model of
collective contract enforcement, section 301(b) refutes the argument that
the statute contemplated that state law would continue to govern the
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement under section 301(a).
On the contrary, it suggests that the federal statute would displace con-
flicting state laws with uniform federal rules, a view the committee re-
ports and debates on the statute confirm.
3. Structural Evidence of the Federal Substantive Scheme
The internal structural consistency of the rules in section 301 lends
additional support to the claim that Congress intended section 301(a) to
establish a federal right to labor contract enforcement.21 Certain of the
supplemental rules in section 301(b) apply by their terms only to labor
question presented in Westinghouse, see Bunn, supra note 137, at 1258; Gregory, supra note 212, at
642.
216. See supra note 215.
217. See supra note 173.
218. As finally enacted, section 301 creates two different categories of rules. One category, ex-
emplified by the provision in section 301(a) that authorizes federal courts to hear suits for violation
of labor contracts, applies only to labor organizations that "represent employees in an industry af-
fecting commerce." The second category of rules applies to all labor organizations without regard to
their affect on commerce.
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organizations that represent employees in an industry affecting com-
merce, language that parallels the interstate commerce language of the
contract enforcement provision in section 301(a).21 9 The remaining pro-
visions, which appear to be rules of general application, omit any refer-
ence to interstate commerce. Although the literature on section 301 has
largely ignored the difference between the commerce-linked and the gen-
erally applicable rules,22 a reference in the House-Senate conference re-
port on the statute makes clear that Congress purposefully drew the
distinction.221
One can make sense of the distinction between the two categories of
rules by viewing the commerce-linked rules as applicable only to actions
to enforce the collective bargaining agreement under section 301(a); on
such an interpretation, the generally applicable rules govern all claims
against unions, such as those under section 303,222 as to which federal
law supplies the rule of decision. The internal logic of the rules certainly
supports this explanation. Thus, the provision that permits unions to sue
and be sued includes commerce language that links the provision to ac-
tions under section 301(a) to enforce labor contracts. Such a limited ca-
pacity rule was all that Congress needed to enact in view of the fact that
Rule 17(b) gave unions capacity in other actions governed by federal sub-
stantive law.223 By contrast, Congress intended the provision that limits
219. Each of the rules in section 301 that Congress meant to apply specifically to federal claims
to enforce the labor contract included the limiting reference to labor organizations that "represent
employees in an industry affecting commerce." Such language appeared in the agency rule, as well
as the capacity rule in section 301(b). See 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982).
220. The only considered discussion in the literature fails to offer a cogent account of the distinc-
tion between the commerce-linked rules in section 310 and those of general applicability. Former
Labor Board General Counsel Gerald Van Arkel notes the distinction, see infra note 221, and sug-
gests that the conferees' reference to rules of general applicability may have been meant to suggest
that unions were to be subject to suit in tort as well as contract. See G. VAN ARKEL, AN ANALYSIS
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, 61 (1947). Van Arkel ultimately rejects that
interpretation on the ground that it would improperly confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to
hear state law tort claims, a conclusion with which I certainly agree but one that leaves the reference
in the conference report unexplained.
221. The Conference Report explains that certain provisions of section 301(b) "and the suc-
ceeding subsections of section 301 ... are general in their application, as distinquished from subsec-
tion (a)." HOUSE REPORT ON H.R. 3020, H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66, reprinted in
1 LEGIs. HIsT., supra note 47, at 570.
222. See 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982) (establishing union liability for secondary boycotts and other
"abusive" practices). See supra note 193.
223. Section 301(b) confers capacity on labor organizations to sue or be sued as an entity and on
behalf of the employees they represent. See supra note 32. Congress certainly had no reason to
define the capacity of unions in a rule of general applicability; Rule 17(b) and Coronado Coal had
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the enforcement of money judgments to the union's assets and immu-
nizes the assets of individual members from such enforcement proceed-
ings to control not just in actions to enforce labor contracts but also in
federal antitrust actions and other actions brought against unions on the
basis of federal law.224 In keeping with the interpretation proposed here,
the provision relating to the enforcement of judgments does not contain
any reference to commerce that would limit the rule's application to con-
tract actions.
On this reading of the statute, section 301 assumes that actions to en-
force labor contracts will present a federal question.225 The commerce-
linked rules in section 301 were specifically intended to govern such en-
forcement suits. While the rules of general application in section 301
were meant to apply to all federal question claims involving unions, they
were clearly meant to control actions under section 301(a) to enforce
labor contracts as well. By treating claims arising under section 301(a)
like other federal claims against unions to which the supplemental rules
of general applicability were meant to apply, the statute's structure sug-
gests that contract actions present a federal question.
previously established such capacity in all cases in which unions were alleged to have violated federal
substantive law. See supra note 163. Moreover, it would have made little sense for Congress to have
extended the union's right to bring representative suits on behalf of their employees to other federal
remedial schemes, most of which operated to impose liability on unions for wrongful conduct rather
than to confer enforceable rights on the union or its members.
224. Section 301(b) declares that money judgments against a labor organization may be enforced
only against the assets of the union as an entity; the statute specifically forbids enforcement of such
claims against the assets of individual union members. Congress enacted this rule of immunity for
union members to foreclose the possibility of a recurrence of the result in the Danbury Hatters case,
in which union members lost their homes to satisfy a federal antitrust judgment. See 92 CONG. REC.
5705 (1946) (statement of Sen. Taft); 93 CONG. REC. 3839 (1947) (same). See generally Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 406-07 & n.6 (1981) (collecting legislative history in sup-
port of view that Congress meant to immunize members from liability in all actions for violation of
labor contracts; specifically recognizing that the immunity rule was meant to apply to other federal
substantive claims against unions). Congress evidently intended that the rule of immunity would
apply in every case in which unions faced federally created liability. Significantly, this would include
suits for violation of the antitrust laws, suits for violation of section 303, and suits under section
301(a) for violation of the labor contract. The immunity rule was therefore couched in terms of
general applicability; the limiting reference to unions that meet the commerce test was not included.
225. Taft not only made comments during the debates that reflected his understanding that labor
contract enforcement actions would present federal questions made actionable by section 301, see
infra note 241, he specifically stated this view during an exchange with Secretary of Labor Schwel-
lenbach, who appeared before the Senate committee to question the wisdom of federalizing labor
contracts. See infra note 248.
Washington University Open Scholarship
298 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:243
4. The Committee Reports and Debates
Statements by the legislation's sponsor, Senator Taft, and the reports
of the principal committees confirm that section 301 was designed to
make collective bargaining agreements enforceable as a matter of federal
law. Section 301 took shape during the Senate labor committee's consid-
eration of the Case bill in 1946.226 After studying the bill in commit-
tee,227 Taft produced language essentially similar to the current version
of section 301 that he proposed for adoption as section 10(a) of the Case
bill.228 Although the committee rejected section 10(a), Taft led a suc-
226. During the 1940s, Congress considered a host of provisions to ensure compliance with col-
lective bargaining agreements, see Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444-45 & nf. 3-6 (1955) (collecting authority), but concern with labor
contract enforcement crystallized during House consideration of the Case bill in 1946. The bill,
which Representative Case introduced on the House floor, declared in section 10(a) that all collec-
tive bargaining agreements "shall be mutually and equally binding and enforceable either at law or
in equity, any other law to the contrary notwithstanding." 92 CONG. REc. 765 (1946) (quoting
language of § 10(a) of Case bill).
When the Senate labor committee later considered the House provision, it underwent substantial
change. See infra note 228. The House accepted the Senate's modified version without requesting a
conference. See infra note 230.
227. Representative Case appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Education to
answer questions about his bill. No one questioned the propriety of making labor contracts enforce-
able as a matter of federal law, but Senator Taft raised a host of questions about the effectiveness of
the Case approach. Taft first asked Case whether he meant to give jurisdiction to the federal courts
in purely local collective bargaining contracts not dealing with interstate commerce. While Case
expressed the view that the field of intrastate commerce was vanishing under Supreme Court deci-
sions, he agreed to exempt local contracts from the bill. See Labor Disputes Act of 1946: Hearings
Before a Subcomm of the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor on H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8-10 (1946).
Taft's second question was more fundamental. He expressed concern that a simple declaration
that labor contracts were binding and enforceable would fail to remove the obstacles to state court
enforcement of collective agreements. Id. Taft thus articulated much the same position that he later
presented in defense of section 301: That the union's status as an unincorporated association made
state court enforcement proceedings ineffective.
228. Taft's minority supplement to the Senate Labor Committee's report on H.R. 4908 proposed
the adoption of a statute providing for federal court suits to enforce the labor contract. The proposal
read as follows:
Section (a) Suits for violation of a contract concluded as the result of collective bargain-
ing between an employer and a labor organization if such contract affects commerce as
defined in this Act may be brought in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization whose activities affect commerce as defined in this Act shall
be bound by the acts of its duly authorized agents acting within the scope of their authority
from the said labor organization and may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States: Provided, that any money
judgment against such labor organization shall be enforceable only against the organization
as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual mem-
ber or his assets.
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cessful floor fight that resulted in the Senate's adoption of the provi-
sion.229 The House later accepted this provision23 1 without illuminating
discussion, 231 and it was included in the final version of the bill that Tru-
man vetoed.232 Much the same language was reintroduced in 1947 and
was adopted as section 301.233 Thus, the legislative history of section 301
S. REP. No. 1177, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1946) (minority report). The proposed statute also
contained provisions governing venue and service of process that resemble sections 301(c)-(d) of the
Act as it was finally enacted.
229. See 92 CONG. REc. 5723 (1946).
230. The House accepted the Senate bill without demanding a conference. Thus, the bill submit-
ted to President Truman was substantially identical to the Taft proposal.
231. The House debates certainly recognize that the bill was meant to establish federal law. See
92 CONG. REc. 5930 (1946) ("All this section on suability does is to carry out the same purpose we
had in the House bill, when we provided for making contracts actually binding upon both parties to
it. It has been found that while a few States permit suing on a labor contract, many states do not.
Unless you have some such provision as this in Federal law, collective-bargaining contracts will not
be good .... ) (comment of Rep. Case). Most speakers focused more generally on the bill's provi-
sion for the mutual enforcement of labor contracts. See 92 CONG. REc. 5942, 5944 (1946) (com-
ments of Reps. Slaughter and Springer noting the purpose of the bill to make the labor contract
binding on both parties). In general, it appears that the House was willing to defer to the Senate
concerning the manner in which the bill would accomplish this result. See 92 CONG. REc. 5930
(1946) ("So the Senate very carefully and properly drafted this provision in the way they did, to
insure that 'contracts,' again in the words of President Truman, 'once made must be lived up to' and
'changed only in the manner agreed upon by the parties.' ") (comment of Rep. Case).
232. See H.R. Doc. No. 651, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (Truman's veto message).
233. Of the bills dealing with industrial relations in the House, only H.R. 725 included a provi-
sion for enforcement of labor contracts; it was virtually identical to the Case bill. See 1 Amendments
to the National Labor Relations Act" Hearings Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor on
H.R. 8, 725, 880, 1095, and 1096, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). On the Senate side, language similar
to the Case bill appeared in S.55, which Senators Taft and Ball introduced, see Hearings Before the
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S 55 and S. Re. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), and in
the bill as it passed the Senate. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 121, reprinted in 1 LEGIs.
HisT., supra note 47, at 279. A somewhat different formulation was included in the bill the House
enacted. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 64, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HST., supra note 47, at
221 ("Any action for or proceeding involving a violation of an agreement between an employer and a
labor organization or other representative of employees may be brought by either party in any dis-
trict court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without regard to the amount in
controversy, if such agreement affects commerce, or the court otherwise has jurisdiction of the
cause.") The conflicting drafts were submitted to a conference committee and the bill that emerged
from conference, See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24, reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIsT.,
supra note 47, at 527-28, was enacted over Truman's veto. See 93 CONG. REc. 7504 (1947), re-
printed in 1 LEGIS. HmST., supra note 47, at 922 (recording June 20, 1947 vote in House to override
Truman's veto); 93 CONG. REc. 7692 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 47, at 1656
(recording Senate's vote to override).
Sections 301(a) and 301(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a), (b) (1982), differ in only four respects from the
language that Taft proposed in 1946. First, the limiting reference to contracts "concluded as a result
of collective bargaining" was dropped from the statute in an apparent effort to make clear that the
statute applied to other labor contracts between employers and unions. See infra note 258. Second,
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begins with the 1946 deliberations on the Case bill.234
The 1946 deliberations clearly reflect a congressional understanding
that the precursor of section 301(a) would make collective bargaining
agreements equally binding and enforceable as a matter of federal law.235
In the 1946 Senate minority report that recommended adoption of the
statute, Taft reviewed the nature of the problem in some detail. (Indeed,
much of the 1946 Senate minority report was incorporated into the better
known 1947 majority report of the same committee.) In explaining why
his statute was necessary, Taft's report on the proposal first explained
that "neither the Wagner Act nor any other Federal statute makes labor
unions legally responsible for carrying out their agreements. ' 236 After
canvassing the obstacles to effective state court enforcement of such
agreements, Taft's report declared that "statutory recognition of the col-
lective agreement as a valid, binding and enforceable contract is a logical
and necessary step."'237
the affecting commerce test was altered during Senate hearings on the bill in 1947 to focus not on the
question whether the contract "affects commerce," but on whether the labor organization represents
employees in an industry that affects commerce. Third, Congress added a provision that made clear
that the statute permitted suit in federal court without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Fourth, Congress added a provision conferring jurisdiction in suits for violation of contracts "be-
tween labor organizations." Minor changes were also made in the proviso to section 301(b) that
immunized members from damages claims.
234. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has recognized the relevance of materials from
prior sessions in cases in which the language of the statute "crystallized" at an earlier time. See
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 336 U.S. 601, 605.06 n.6 (1949)
(where the "essence of the legislation remained constant"); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204 (1980) (where the "operative language of the original bill was substantially
carried forward into the Act"); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404-05 n.14 (1973). These
principles support the Court's consideration of Case bill materials from the 79th Congress in its
interpretation of section 301. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962)
(section 10 of the Case bill was the "direct antecedent" of section 301); Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444 (1955) (Frankfurter, J,) (same).
235. Justice Frankfurter argued that Senator Taft's new version of section 10(a) transformed a
provision that declared contracts mutually binding into a statute that merely provided a federal
forum. See Westinghouse, 348 U.S. at 444-47. But there is no suggestion in the 1946 deliberations
that Taft's version of the statute was meant to strip the statute of substantive content. To the con-
trary, Taft's minority report describes his version of the statute as granting statutory recognition to
the enforceability of labor contracts, and the House viewed Taft's version as comparable to its own.
See supra note 231.
236. S. REP. No. 1177, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1946) (minority report).
237. Id. at 13. That Senator Taft obviously understood the implications of Rule 17(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see supra note 163, offers additional support for the proposition
that section 301 was meant to establish federal substantive rights. Rule 17(b) and the decision in
Busby v. Electric Utils. Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72 (1945), suggest that, so long as state law
supplies the rule of decision in labor contract enforcement actions, state law will also govern the
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The minority report thus described the proposed statute as if the provi-
sion making violations of labor contracts actionable in federal court
would impose on unions a federal obligation to comply with the collec-
tive agreements. It was certainly debated on those terms. Senator Mur-
ray, speaking in opposition to Taft's proposed amendment to the Senate
version of the Case bill, described the proposal as follows: "[T]he minor-
ity members... proposing this amendment would create a completely
new Federal right in the United States courts."23 Comments by Senator
Magnuson in opposition were to the same effect.239
For his part, Senator Taft sought to minimize the importance of the
creation of new federal substantive law, and therefore emphasized the
"practical" character of the problem he proposed to address.2" But Taft
capacity of the union to sue and be sued in the federal courts. Taft was aware of Rule 17(b) and
Busby incorporates the language of Rule 17(b) in his minority report on the Case bill specifically
noting that existing federal law failed to establish a "substantive right" to labor contract enforcement
and thus failed to make unions suable in federal court. S. REP. No. 1177, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-14
(1946) (minority report). Taft thus understood that, to achieve the goal of suability, Congress was
obliged not only to give unions the capacity to sue but also to establish a federal substantive right to
contract enforcement.
238. 92 CONG. REc. 5708 (1946). Senator Murray went on to attack the proposed creation of
this new federal right on the ground that it singled out unions for special federal treatment. As
Murray explained, the proposal "would not create this new right as against all unincorporated as-
sociations, but it would set up a new and special court right against unions." After describing the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts under which contract enforcement actions would normally
proceed, Murray explained that the proposal would "take labor agreements out of the category of
normal State court operations, and would make them at all times and under all circumstances a
matter for the Federal courts. The proposal would create a new and special Federal right to enforce
in the Federal courts the terms in a labor agreement." Id.
239. Senator Magnuson described Taft's amendment as one to "create a right of action, under
Federal statute, for breach of a collective bargaining agreement." 92 CONG. REc. 5412 (1946).
Magnuson opposed the proposal in part because three-fourths of the states permit suits against unin-
corporated associations and in part because he saw no reason for the federal government to invade
the realm of the states in making law to govern purely private contracts. Id. at 5414.
240. Taft had emphasized the "practical" difficulties in suing unions in his discussion with repre-
sentative Case at the Senate hearing on the bill. See Labor Disputes Act of 1946: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor on H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1946). He took the same position in his statement to the 80th Congress in support of section 301.
See 93 CONG. REc. 3839 (1947) ("As a matter of law unions, of course, are liable in theory on their
contracts today, but as a practical matter it is difficult to sue them. They are not incorporated; they
have many members; in some States all the members must be served; it is difficult to know who is to
be served.")
Frankfurter suggested that Taft's description of the problem as "practical" supports Frankfurter's
claim that Congress was seeking only to solve procedural problems. See supra note 186. But the
attempt to equate the terms does not withstand scrutiny. True, Taft recognized that collective agree-
ments were, on one theory or another, binding in most of the states. But the purpose of the statute
was to establish a uniform federal theory for the enforcement of the labor contract by and against its
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was quite clear in stating that the new law would subject unions to suits
in federal court and that federal law should govern their liability. During
debate on the proposed amendment, Taft explained that if the collective
agreement affected interstate commerce, the suit against a union could
proceed in federal court because it necessarily "involves a Federal ques-
tion."24 Moreover, Taft never once took issue with the opposition's
characterization of his amendment as proposing the creation of a federal
substantive right to contract enforcement.
The deliberations of the 80th Congress one year later demonstrate that
Congress was still troubled by the disparity in state approaches and still
impressed with the need for a uniform federal rule.2 42 Thus, the Senate
report on section 301 parrots the statements of the minority report on the
Case bill in emphasizing the importance of a uniform rule.243 It also
repeats the argument that statutory recognition of the collective bargain-
ing agreement as a "valid, binding and enforceable contract is a logical
and necessary step." 2' In short, the Senate report on Taft-Hartley re-
flects the view that Congress had expressed a year before during its con-
sideration of the Case bill: the importance of ensuring mutual
compliance with the collective bargaining agreement warranted the crea-
tion of a new federal substantive right to labor contract enforcement.
two principals, the union and the employer, and to escape from the problems associated with the
state courts' preoccupation with individual contracts of enforcement. Taft certainly understood that
the statute created federal substantive law; his reference to the fact that most state courts enforce the
collective agreement was meant to downplay the significance of § 301.
241. See 92 CONG. REc. 5705 (1946) ("All we provide in the amendment is that voluntary
associations shall in effect be suable as if they were corporations, and suable in the Federal courts if
the contract involves interstate commerce and therefore involves a Federal question.")
242. Perhaps the most illuminating exchange took place between Secretary of Labor Schwel-
lenbach and the members of the House and Senate committees on labor. In prepared remarks to
both committees, Schwellenbach pointed out that 35 of the 48 states had adopted rules that permit-
ted suits against labor unions. Schwellenbach thus argued that the passage of federal law was unnec-
essary; under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, most federal courts could freely
enforce collective agreements by relying on the capacity rules of the states, assuming, of course, that
the requirements of diversity jurisdiction were staisfied. See Hearings Before the Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor on H.R. 725, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 3016-17; Labor Relations Program: the Hearings
Before the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and S.J. Re& 22, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 56-
58.
Unions unanimously opposed federal enforcement of labor contracts; like Schwellenbach's, their
submissions to the Senate committee emphasized that state law generally regarded collective bar-
gaining agreements as enforceable. See id. at 1042, 1154, 1391, 1534, 1547, 2295. Congress was not
persuaded.
243. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18, reprinted in I LEGIS. HIST., supra note 47,
at 421-24.
244. Id. at 17, 1 LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 47, at 423.
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The most revealing exchange on the substantive content of section 301
took place during testimony by Labor Secretary Lewis Schwellenbach.
Appearing before the Senate Labor Committee, Schwellenbach suggested
that state law would govern the enforcement of labor contracts under
section 301.245 Then, raising precisely the argument that Frankfurter
later espoused in his Lincoln Mills dissent, Schwellenbach expressed
doubts as to whether such state law claims would arise under the laws of
the United States for jurisdictional purposes.'" The House minority re-
port on the provision that became section 301 echoed Schwellenbach's
constitutional doubts.2 47
Senator Taft responded to Schwellenbach's argument by expressly dis-
agreeing with its assumption that state law would control in actions aris-
ing under section 301: "Mr. Secretary, of course, the basis for the
jurisdiction is the Federal law." '48 Taft then explained that federal law
controlled the obligation to negotiate collective bargaining agreements
245. Early in his remarks, Schwellenbach had questioned whether it was appropriate to abandon
state court enforcement of the collective agreement. See supra note 242. Next, Schwellenbach made
clear his understanding that state law would control section 301 actions by questioning the wisdom
of abandoning the diversity requirement for such claims. See Labor Relations Program: Hearings
Before the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and S... Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56
(1947).
246. Schwellenbach's statement was as follows:
In fact I doubt that the [diversity requirement] can be abandoned constitutionally. The
Constitution, as you know, limits suits in the federal courts to cases arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. I have grappled with the . . . meaning of
"arising under the laws of the United States.. ." a good many times and I make no
categorical statement as to whether or not under this proposal [sic] legislation the courts
would hold that suits so started could arise under the laws of the United States. However,
the general concept always has been in private litigation that a necessary prerequisite to
federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship.
Id. at 56.
247. See MINotrrY REPORT ON H.R. 3020, H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 109-10,
reprinted in I LEGIS. HisT., supra note 47, at 400-01.
248. The complete text of Taft's response was as follows:
Mr. Secretary, of course, the basis for the jurisdiction is the Federal law-in other words,
we are saying that all matters of collective bargaining contracts shall be made in certain
ways; that both parties shall be compelled to negotiate them, and they furnish the solution
for a difficulty, which is an interstate commerce difficulty. I don't see why suits regarding
such collective-bargaining contracts, when made, are not properly the subject of Federal
law arising under the laws of the United States, therefore properly subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal courts. I don't understand how we can cover the whole subject, as we
do, in Federal laws, and then say, when you come down to suing about it, that the Federal
court has no jurisdiction.
Labor Relations Program: Hearings Before the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and
SJ Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1947). Taft's sophisticated explanation of the jurisdictional
issue that later arose in Lincoln Mills explains why Cox later described him as having understood the
difficult legal questions associated with the passage of Taft-Hartley "better than any other member of
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and asked why "suits regarding such collective-bargaining contracts,
when made, are not properly the subject of Federal law arising under the
laws of the United States, therefore properly subject to the jurisdiction of
the Federal courts."'249 Taft's rhetorical query defending the enforce-
ment of labor contracts as a proper subject for the exercise of federal
power, reflects his view that section 301 made federal law applicable to
such enforcement claims, and lays to rest any doubts about the statute's
constitutionality under article III.
The significance of Taft's reply was not lost on Justice Frankfurter,
who dealt with it in a surprisingly disingenuous manner. In his plurality
opinion in Westinghouse, Frankfurter misleadingly cites the Schwel-
lenbach testimony to support the proposition that section 301 was under-
stood to incorporate state law.25 0 Frankfurter, however, declined to set
forth the Taft rejoinder. Instead, Frankfurter asserted that no one de-
nied the controlling force of state law and specifically claimed that Taft
did not "justify section 301 as dependent on federal substantive law. '25 1
Frankfurter then quoted the general description of section 301 that Taft
offered during subsequent debates on the statute, which emphasized
practical problems with enforcement of labor contracts in state courts, as
if it were the only response Taft offered to Schwellenbach.252
5. The "Usual Processes of Law"
In addition to evidence that section 301 established a federal substan-
tive right to contract enforcement, the legislative history of section 30 1(a)
makes it clear that Congress intended for the federal courts to work out
the detailed rules that would govern the enforcement of labor contracts.
This conclusion emerges from a careful review of the structural changes
Congress." Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297, 1315 n.76
(1954).
249. Labor Relations Program: Hearings Before the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S.
55 and S.f Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sesa 57 (1947).
250. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437, 448 (1955).
251. Id. at 449.
252. Id. In setting forth a comment Taft made later in the debates, rather than Taft's actual
reply to Schwellenbach, Frankfurter wrongly suggested that Taft, and the members of Congress who
accepted his leadership on section 301, simply failed to understand the article III implications of the
statute and blundered into making state law applicable. It thus appears that Frankfurter engaged in
a strategic misrepresentation, rather than a reasoned elaboration, of Taft's understanding of the
legislation.
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to the Senate's labor contract enforcement scheme that the House-Senate
conference committee adopted at the insistence of the House conferees.
The Senate bill had divided labor contract enforcement responsibilities
between the Labor Board and the federal courts.253 The House, in con-
trast, vested enforcement powers solely in the federal courts. 54
Although the House conferees agreed early in the conference to work
from the Senate bill in order to preserve the votes necessary to override
Truman's expected veto,255 they pushed successfully for the consolida-
tion of contract enforcement powers in the federal courts. 256 To effect
this change, provisions in the Senate bill defining violations of the labor
contract as unfair labor practices were dropped altogether,257 and the
253. Sections 8(aX6) and 8(bX5) of the Senate bill made it an unfair labor practice for employers
and unions to "violate the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement or the terms of an agreement to
submit a labor dispute to arbitration." See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 81, reprinted in I LEG's.
HisT., supra note 47, at 239 (setting forth the Senate version of section 8(aX6)); H.R. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 83-84, reprinted in I LEG s. HisT., supra note 47, at 241-42 (setting forth the Senate
version of section 8(b)(5)). At the same time, the Senate bill gave the federal courts jurisdiction to
hear suits for violation of the collective bargaining agreement. See supra note 233. The Senate
report describes section 301 as applying to actions for breach of collective bargaining agreements and
indicates that it "should be read in connection with the provisions of section 8 of title I also dealing
with breach of contracts." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, reprinted in I LEG'S. Hisr.,
supra note 47, at 436. The Senate thus contemplated that the Board and the federal courts would
exercise overlapping jurisdiction over the collective agreement.
254. Section 302 of the House bill conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear any action
"involving a violation of an agreement between an employer and a labor organization." H.R. 3020,
S0th Cong., 1st Sess. 64, reprinted in I LFGIs. HIST., supra note 47, at 221 (quoting section 302(a)).
But the House bill gave the Labor Board no role in the enforcement of such labor agreements. See
93 CONG. REc. 6600 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEcis. HIsT., supra note 47, at 1539 (statement of Sen.
Taft).
The failure of the House to authorize the Labor Board to enforce the collective bargain was no
accident. The House was quite hostile towards the agency, believing that it had been captured by
organized labor. Indeed, section 102 of the House bill called for the abolition of the agency and the
creation of a successor board. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-53, reprinted in 1 LEGIS.
HIsT. 208-10.
255. See Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 285,
298 (1960); H. MILL'S & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at 384.
256. During debate on the conference bill in the Senate, Senator Taft introduced a statement that
has been accepted by courts and commentators as an important guide to the compromises made in
conference. The Taft statement explains that the House conferees objected to sections 8(a)(6) and
8(bX5) of the Senate bill on the ground that those provisions made the Board responsible for policing
union and employer compliance with collective bargaining agreements; the House wanted to transfer
this responsibility to the courts. Accordingly, as the Taft statement reports, the provision in section
301 for judicial enforcement of the collective agreement was retained in the conference agreement.
See 93 CONG. REc. 6600 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HisT., supra note 47, at 1539 (statement of
Sen. Taft).
257. Compare S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35, reprinted in I LEG'S. HimT., supra note
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language of section 301(a) was modified slightly.25 The conference re-
port highlights these changes in the Senate bill and notes the deletion of
the unfair labor practice provisions. It explains the changes as the result
of a compromise that was intended to leave the enforcement of the labor
contract to the "usual processes of law and not to the [Board]."'25 9
This transfer of enforcement power from the Labor Board to the fed-
eral courts makes clear that Congress intended the federal courts to fash-
ion law to govern the collective agreement. Under the Senate bill, the
Labor Board was meant to hear and resolve charges that alleged viola-
tion of the labor contract. Both the House and Senate conferees under-
stood that in the course of hearing such claims, the Labor Board would
develop a body of federal law defining the nature of the obligation of
employers and unions to comply with their contracts."6 After all, the
47, at 441 (quoting Senate version of sections) with H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7,
reprinted in 1 LEGiS. HIST., supra note 47, at 511 (showing absence of provisions).
258. The Senate version of section 301 initially permitted federal courts to hear suits for breach
of agreements concluded as a result of collective bargaining. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 30, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 47, at 436. The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) had jurisdiction over agreements reached through collective bargaining and over agree-
ments to submit disputes to arbitration under sections 8(a)(6) and 8(b)(5). The conference agree-
ment eliminated the NLRB's role at the same time it broadened section 301 to reach suits for
violations of all contracts by striking the Senate's qualifying reference to collective bargaining. See
H.R. CON. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 23, reprinted in 1 LEMIS. HIST., supra note 47, at 527
(quoting section 301 of the Act). It thus appears that the conferees intended the federal courts to
assert jurisdiction over both collective bargaining agreements and agreements to arbitrate labor dis-
putes. Cf Reilly, supra note 255, at 299 (House was also opposed to permitting the Labor Board to
police arbitration agreements).
259. H.R. CON. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, reprinted in 1 LEGis. HIST., supra note
47, at 46.
260. The Senate's bifurcated enforcement scheme for labor contracts was quite similar to the
enforcement approach the Senate proposed and Congress adopted in regulating such union unfair
labor practices as secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes. In provisions eventually adopted
by the conference, section 8(b)(4) of the Senate bill had defined the unions' use of such economic
weapons as unfair labor practices. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23, 35, reprinted in
I LEGis. HIsr., supra note 47, at 428-29, 441 (describing the effect, and quoting the lahguage, of
section 8(b)(4); H.R. CON. REP. No. 510 ON H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, reprinted In 1
LEGIs. H sr., supra note 47, at 548 (reflecting conference committee's adoption of Senate provision
with minor alterations). Moreover, sections 10(j) and 10(1) of the Senate bill authorized the Board in
appropriate cases to ask federal courts to enjoin such practices preliminarily, and thus created an
explicit exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act's bar to injunctions in labor disputes. See S. REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 40, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 47, at 433, 446
(describing the effect, and quoting the language, of sections 10(j)-1), which conferred such authority
on the Board). While the Board was given control over equitable remedies, it had no general author-
ity to fashion damages remedies for such unfair practices. Instead, claims for damages were made
the subject of federal court suits under the rubric of section 303. This provision for federal court
claims had been proposed in supplemental views appended to the Senate report, see S. REP. No. 105,
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Board followed the practice of working out the detailed meaning of the
statute's general language, not by engaging in formal rulemaking pro-
ceedings, but by fashioning rules case by case through the adjudication of
unfair labor practice claims.26 1 During consideration of the Taft-Hartley
amendments in 1947, both chambers of Congress were acutely aware of
the Board's case-by-case methodology and the content of the specific
rules it had adopted.262 Although Congress did not disturb the Labor
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-56, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. Hisr., supra note 47, at 460-62, and was adopted
on the floor of the Senate, albeit without any provision for issuance of injunctive relief. See 93
CONG. REc. 5076 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HisT., supra note 47 at 1399-1400.
Under this bifurcated enforcement scheme, the Labor Board has played a wide-ranging role in the
definition of secondary boycotts and other unlawful union practices under section 8(bX4). See gener-
ally 2 C. MoRIs, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1136-1178 (2d ed. 1983). While injured parties may bring damage
claims in court under section 303 without first obtaining the Board's ruling on the disputed conduct,
see International Longshoremen's Union & Warehousemen v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237
(1952), the courts generally apply Board-developed 8(bX4) principles in determining liability under
section 303 and accord res judicata effect to prior Board proceedings. See 2 C. MoRIs, supra, at
1182 n.279 (collecting cases).
The Senate undoubtedly intended to create a similar bifurcated enforcement scheme to govern
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, sections 8(aX6) and 8(bX5) of the Senate
bill defined breaches of contract by both the employer and the union as unfair labor practices that
would trigger the Board's cease and desist enforcement authority. Section 301(a), like the parallel
provisions in section 303, created a federal claim for damages for breach of the collective agreement.
The Senate thus contemplated that the Board would play a role in defining the parties' federal obli-
gation to respect their labor contracts similar to that it has played in defining secondary boycotts and
jurisdictional strikes under section 8(bX4).
261. Whatever its merits, the Board's preference for announcing substantive rules by adjudica-
tion, rather than rulemaking, was firmly established as of the date Congress considered the Taft-
Hartley amendments. In Matter of Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB 828, 844 (1943), the Board held
that although an employer was presumptively free to impose restrictions on its employees' union
solicitation activities during working time, rules that conditioned solicitation outside working hours
were presumptively invalid in the absence of "special circumstances." The Supreme Court upheld
the Board's application of its Peyton Packing rule in subsequent cases despite the employer's objec-
tion that the Board's orders rest "on a policy formulated without due administrative procedure."
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945). The Court viewed the Board's devel-
opment of presumptive rules for application to concrete cases without formal rulemaking procedures
as fully consistent with the Wagner Act's decision to leave "to the Board the work of applying the
Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be
charged as violations of its terms." Id. at 798.
Adhering to the practice that the Court approved in Republic Aviation, the Board has continued
to develop its substantive rules through adjudication rather than rulemaking-a practice that has
been widely acknowledged and vigorously criticized in the literature. See generally Bernstein, The
NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J.
571 (1970); Peck, The Atrophied Rule Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70
YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
262. It was precisely the content of the rules that the Labor Board had evolved in its case-by-
case elucidation of the Wagner Act that led to the adoption of many of the Taft-Hartley changes. To
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Board's case-by-case approach,263 the specific power to define an actiona-
ble violation of a labor contract was consolidated in the federal courts.264
Congress thus vested the federal courts with the responsibility that the
Labor Board would have exercised under the Senate bill for the case-by-
case development of federal contract enforcement rules. The reference in
the conference report to the enforcement of labor contracts in accordance
with the "usual processes of law" refers to and approves the exercise of
this lawmaking power by the federal courts.2 65
cite but one well-known example, the Labor Board had concluded that the employer's obligation to
refrain from interfering with its employees' section 7 rights to join or form labor organizations pre-
cluded it from expressing opposition to unionization. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 140-41 (10th ed. 1986). Congress added section 8(c) to protect
the employer's right to speak freely, and thus rejected the Board's interpretation.
For other instances in which Congress reversed the Labor Board's development of interpretive
rules by statutory changes to the Wagner Act, see S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, re-
printed in I LEGIs. HiSr., supra note 47, at 430 (describing section 9(a)'s proviso as intended to
clarify the right of individual employees to present grievances to their employer without the presence
of the bargaining representative; observing that the Board "has not given full effect to this right as
defined in the present statute"); H.R. CON. REP. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34,
reprinted in 1 LEGls. Hrsr., supra note 47, at 538 (commenting that the new definition of the duty to
bargain collectively in section 8(d) of the Act was meant to reject the Board's requirement that, to
satisfy its obligation under the Act to bargain in good faith, an employer must make reasonable
counter-offers or concessions).
263. As noted above, the House bill would have abolished the existing Labor Board and trans-
ferred its judicial function in deciding cases to a successor agency. The conference agreement re-
tained the Labor Board, but vested the final authority to investigate charges and issue complaints in
a general counsel appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. This estab-
lished some separation between the Board's judicial function and the general counsel's prosecutorial
function, but left the members of the Board with the power to fashion rules to govern industrial
relations on a case-by-case basis. See H.R. CON. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37, re-
printed in 1 LEGIs. Hisr., supra note 47, at 540-41.
Section 6 of the Wagner Act authorized the Board to make, amend, and rescind rules and regula-
tions to carry out the provisions of the Act. See Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 6, 49 Stat. 452. The Taft-
Hartley Act modified this provision slightly, incorporating by reference the requirements of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act in any such rulemaking. See Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong, 1st Sess., § 6,
61 Stat. 140 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982)). Nothing in Taft-Hartley, however, required
the Board as a general matter to proceed by rulemaking rather than adjudication. Accordingly,
despite some restrictive language in earlier decisions, the Supreme Court has indicated that the
"choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's jurisdic-
tion." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
264. Although Professor Gregory described the judicial power established in the Lincoln Mills
decision as "reminiscent of the extradordinarily varied administrative powers turned over by Con-
gress to the NLRB in the original Wagner Act," C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 471 (2d rev.
ed. 1958), it did not occur to him that Congress had meant to confer such powers on the courts.
265. Wollett and Wellington suggest that this reference to the "usual processes of the law" may
have been meant to authorize common law rulemaking by either state or federal courts and thus fails
unambigously to contemplate the creation of federal common law. See Wollett & Wellington, supra
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In short, the language, structure, and history of section 301 offer
strong support for the conclusion that Congress intended to impose a
federal obligation on labor and management to comply with the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The legislative record reveals a dissatisfaction
with the disparate approaches of the state courts and the need for a uni-
form federal rule. The rule adopted, making labor contracts enforceable
against unions as if they were corporations, departed markedly from the
existing state models and underscored the congressional intention to
supercede conflicting state law. Members of Congress, moreover, de-
bated the statute as if it would make the enforcement of labor contracts a
federal question, and Senator Taft explicitly defended such a federal ap-
proach against the constitutional attack Frankfurter later mounted in
Lincoln Mills. Finally, Congress evidenced its understanding that the
task of filling out the details of its contract enforcement scheme was a
matter for the federal judiciary to undertake in accordance with the usual
processes of law.
III. LINCOLN MILLS RECONSIDERED
Against the backdrop of this detailed review of the language, structure,
and history of section 301, the opinions in Lincoln Mills deserve careful
reconsideration. Given the evidently substantive focus of section 301 and
the explicit nod of approval Congress gave to the creation of federal com-
mon law, ample support existed for the conclusion Justice Douglas
reached in Lincoln Mills. But what accounts for Douglas's failure to
marshall much of this evidence in support of his reading of the statute?
Many critiques of Lincoln Mills imply that Douglas upheld the enforce-
ability of arbitral agreements, without regard to the history of section
301, because he preferred that result for ideological reasons.266 As others
have shown, however, Justice Douglas produced glib, poorly reasoned
note 128, at 454-55. It is certainly true that section 301(a) does not preclude state courts from
hearing disputes over the labor contract; subsequent Supreme Court decisions make clear that state
courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over such actions. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368
U.S. 502 (1962). Moreover, while state courts must normally apply federal law in labor contract
suits, see Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), they remain theoretically free
under the statute to apply their own rules of decision in cases where the labor contract fails to meet
the test for an effect on interstate commerce. But conference committee's discussion focused entirely
on the choice between federal court enforcement and federal agency enforcement of the labor con-
tract. Understood in context, therefore, the reference to the enforcement of contracts in keeping
with the "usual processes of the law" undoubtedly refers to federal proceedings.
266. Frankfurter suggested that Douglas manipulated the statute's meaning to confer a benefit
on organized labor. See supra note 122. See also Stone, supra note 140, at 1528 (attributing an
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opinions in support of outcomes that he had reached for reasons other
than the purely ideological.267 In any case, one has difficulty identifying
any particular ideological axe that Justice Douglas could grind effectively
by upholding section 301.268 He was quite willing to push the law to
protect the rights of individuals, but the contest between labor and man-
agement did not move him deeply.269 Even if it had, Douglas could not
have predicted with any confidence whether the legal enforcement of la-
bor contracts under section 301 would advance or undercut any interests
he wished covertly to serve.270 More likely, Douglas regarded Lincoln
Mills as an easy case,27 one that did not deserve his full attention as a
lawyer.
The evidently substantive thrust of section 301 raises far more interest-
ing questions about the approach taken in Justice Frankfurter's opinions.
ideological purpose to Douglas opinions that make arbitration the preferred means of dispute
resolution).
267. In his recent assessment of Justice Douglas's philosophy of judging, Professor White makes
a persuasive case for the proposition that although Douglas did not entirely reject traditional doctri-
nal analysis, his treatment of authoritative texts in his opinions was "sufficiently cavalier... to
convey the implicit message that he did not care very much about them." White, supra note 79, at
79. See also Griswold, Foreword to B. WOLFMAN, J. SILVER & M. SILVER, supra note 104, at xi-xii
(describing Douglas's opinions in tax cases as hastily written and unburdened with legal analysis;
suggesting that their content may reflect his lack of intellectual interest in tax cases as well as his
antipathy to the IRS). Cf. V. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 86, at 300 (former clerk describes Douglas
opinions as "com[ing] quickly to the point, and dispos[ing] of the case in language that is frequently
blunt and bold").
268. Of course, the obvious explanation is that Douglas simply reached out to decide a case that
served the interests of organized labor. But Douglas was not a committed supporter of what he
referred to in his autobiography as "big labor," particularly in the years following the merger of the
AFL-CIO. See supra note 105. Moreover, Douglas's subsequent section 301 opinions are difficult to
square with a pro-union bias. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)
(Douglas joins in opinion reaching the arguably anti-union conclusion that arbitration provisions
give rise to implied no-strike promises); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962) (Douglas
dissents from Court's refusal to recognize the federal courts' power under section 301 to enjoin
strikes in breach of a labor contract), overruled, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
269. See supra note 106.
270. In the years immediately following the statute's passage, employers seeking damages for
breach of contract brought most section 301 cases. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 36, at
512-13. Had Douglas sought to foster the interests of unions, therefore, he might have been tempted
to join Frankfurter in eviscerating the statute.
271. As he pointed out in his opinion, the vast majority of lower courts had interpreted section
301 as establishing a federal right to contract enforcement. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 n.2 (1957). Douglas thus dismissed Frankfurter's concern with the niceties
of labor contract enforcement as making "mountains out of molehills." See supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
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Frankfurter manipulated the legislative history of section 301 in at least
two principal respects to support his challenge to the statute's constitu-
tionality. First, Frankfurter described Taft's concern with the union's
associational status as procedural to support his claim that the "merely
jurisdictional" statute incorporated state substantive law.272 Second,
Frankfurter strategically misrepresented Taft's response to Schwel-
lenbach's inquiry, and thus failed to acknowledge that Taft had defended
section 301 as an excercise of federal lawmaking power and had expressly
denied that the statute incorporated state substantive law. 3 In sum,
Frankfurter's finding that the statute violated article III rested on an in-
terpretation of the statute that its principal sponsor had decisively
rejected.
It is, therefore, difficult to escape the conclusion that Frankfurter read
section 301 with an eye hostile to Congress's fundamental purpose in
conferring contract enforcement responsibilities on the federal courts.
The basis for such hostility seems quite evident. Frankfurter was, after
all, firmly convinced that the federal courts lacked the institutional ca-
pacity to police the collective agreement effectively. His own work on
labor injunctions had convinced him that the federal courts should stay
out of the field of industrial relations, and he had drafted the Norris-
LaGuardia Act for the Congress that implemented that policy choice.274
Indeed, Frankfurter's opinion in Lincoln Mills makes no secret of the
fact that he felt the federal courts were institutionally unsuited to the
task of enforcing labor agreements.275
The puzzling question, therefore, is not why Justice Douglas con-
cluded that section 301 authorizes the federal courts to fashion law to
govern the collective bargaining agreement, but why Justice Frank-
furter's contrary conclusion has been so widely accepted. The answer
seems rather complex. Surely part of the explanation lies in Douglas's
slapdash approach to writing opinions. Reviewing the opinions in Lin-
coln Mills, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Frankfurter had the
better of the argument. The text of the opinions makes it appear, in
other words, that Douglas was creating federal lawmaking power out of
whole cloth, rather than conscientiously attempting to discern the intent
272. See supra notes 155-56.
273. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
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of Congress.276
The acceptance of Frankfurter's interpretation by the commentators
surely reflects more than the fact that he outlawyered Douglas. The pas-
sage of Taft-Hartley deeply concerned students of industrial relations.
They feared that section 301 would fundamentally upset the balance of
labor relations, not only by substituting the federal courts for the arbitral
process in the resolution of labor disputes, but by imposing rigidly uni-
form rules that would undermine private adjustment of industrial con-
ffict.277 Frankfurter's approach to the statute, by raising doubts about
the constitutionality of the judicial role under section 301, offered a solu-
tion to the perceived problem of judicial interference. If accepted,
Frankfurter's approach would force Congress to take a second look at
the problem of labor contract enforcement; in a more dispassionate set-
ting, perhaps Congress would recognize the importance of private dis-
pute resolution or vest authority for contract enforcement in the more
experienced Labor Board.278
It was precisely the propriety of forcing a congressional second look
that the leading critics of the Lincoln Mills opinion defended in their
276. Frankfurter's opinions unquestionably influenced the attitudes of many students of indus-
trial relations. In addition to views of his former clerks, Bickel and Wellington, see infra notes 279-
84 and accompanying text, Frankfurter also persuaded Professor Meltzer of the dominantly jurisdic-
tional focus of the statute. See supra note 135. Frankfurter influenced no one's work more dramati-
cally than that of Professor Charles Gregory, however. In his 1948 labor law casebook, Professor
Gregory described section 301 as having effected a "fundamental change in the substantive law
governing the nature and enforcement of collective agreements; for it seems impossible to maintain,
on the grounds that this innovation is merely one of form having to do simply with parties and
association entity, that it has not rendered obsolete most of the judicial common law bearing on the
enforceability of collective agreements." C. GREGORY & H. KArZ, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERI-
ALS AND COMMENTS 1178 (1948). Ten years later, Gregory sounded a different note, describing
Lincoln Mills as having taken the "extraordinary" position that Congress meant to empower the
courts "to make up a patchwork of law themselves." C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 471 (2d
rev. ed. 1958). To underscore his disagreement with this view, Gregory concluded that it was "un-
likely that so much has ever been read into so little before by the Supreme Court." Id. Gregory
summarizes his view of section 301 in his 1959 article on Lincoln Mills Gregory describes the Doug-
las opinion as an example of "dubious technique," one that merely achieved a result for which
Douglas had garnered the requisite votes. See Gregory, The Law of Collective Agreement, 57 MICH.
L. REv. 635 (1959). Moreover, Gregory expresses his own personal view that Frankfurter's inter-
pretation of the statute was correct. See id. at 641 & n.23.
277. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
278. Many labor practitioners thus joined their reviews of Lincoln Mills with a call for addi-
tional legislation. See, eg., Kramer, Arbitration Under the Taft-Hartley Act in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE N.Y.U. ELEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 255, 280-85 (E. Stein ed. 1958).
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classic work on the subject.279 Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington
followed the lead of the man for whom they both clerked in concluding
that section 301 made state rules of decision binding in federal court.
Although they disagreed with Frankfurter's assessment of the constitu-
tional implications of such a conclusion,280 they nonetheless argued that
the Court should have dismissed the action on some plausible basis in
order to force Congress to revisit its decision to delegate labor contract
enforcement responsibilities to the federal courts.2"' Wellington made
the point more explicitly in his later work.28 2 "Congress," he explained,
"sometimes must be saved from itself."28 3 Bickel and Wellington did not
disguise the fact that they premised their argument for a congressional
second look on their view that courts were "enormously unequal to the
task" of fashioning a workable body of federal labor contract law.2" 4
Although the claim that the federal courts lack competence to fashion
labor contract law has had an enduring appeal for labor scholars who
have commented on Lincoln Mills and its progeny,285 subsequent devel-
opments offer little support for the claim.2" 6 Bickel and Wellington
based their argument in part on Shulman's influential claim that judicial
intervention would undermine the arbitral process and in part on their
fear that courts would naturally borrow precedents from the commercial
law of contracts in working out the details of federal law.28 7 Both con-
279. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 15, at 35. For a review of the second-look doctrine, see
G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 26-30 (1982).
280. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 15, at 35 (arguing that section 301 was a constitutional
grant of protective jurisdiction).
281. Bickel and Wellington coupled their argument for the propriety of forcing "sober reconsid-
eration" from Congress with the claim that the Court should candidly discuss the reasons for its
remand to Congress. Id.
282. Wellington's subsequent work on federal labor policy was largely an elaboration of the
thesis he had articulated in commenting on Lincoln Mills-that courts are institutionally unsuited to
resolving labor disputes. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 74.
283. Id. at 125.
284. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 15, at 22-23.
285. See supra note 140-41.
286. Others have frankly disagreed with the suggestion that federal courts lack competence to
fashion labor contract law. Professor Cox has recently argued that the manifold issues raised in
Lincoln Mills were better suited for resolution by the "reasoned elaboration" of the judicial process
than by a "battle of legislative lobbyists." Cox, Book Review, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1463, 1471 n.16
(1982) (reviewing G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)). See also
Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1, 34-37 (1983) (noting that courts enjoy
an advantage over legislatures in fashioning labor contract rules on a case-by-case basis, particularly
where each development could be subjected to scrutiny in the professional literature).
287. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 15, at 23 & n.88.
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cerns were confounded by the work of Professor Cox, who argued that
commercial law contract rules were inapplicable to labor contract en-
forcement and that arbitral dispute resolution in the industrial setting
deserved judicial encouragement and deference.28 The simple fact that,
in the overwhelming majority of the collective bargaining agreements ne-
gotiated in recent years, the parties have chosen arbitration as their
method of dispute resolution offers some support for a benign assessment
of the impact of thirty years of federal court involvement. 28 9
More importantly, the claim of incompetence ignores the fact that the
parties remain free to revise unwieldy judicial interpretations by adopting
language in their next round of negotiations that better accommodates
their specific industrial interests.29 The judicial power that Congress au-
288. On the inapplicability of commercial contract rules, see Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agree-
ment, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 604 (1956). On judicial deference to arbitration, see Cox, Reflections
Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1498-99 (1959). The Court formally adopted
Cox's approach in the famous Steelworkers' Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), quoted in United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960). For comments that attribute much of the
Court's developing body of section 301 common law to the work of Cox, with greater and lesser
degrees of approbation, see Feller, supra note 12, at 719 (any attempt to create a theory of the
collective agreement must begin with the "seminal" work of Cox); Stone, supra note 73, at 1528
(criticizing the Court's acceptance of Cox's argument for making arbitration the centerpiece of labor
policy). Cf. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY ARBITRATORS 331 (J. Stern & B. Dennis
eds. 1981).
289. See supra note 67.
290. For this reason, Wellington appears to overstate his attack on the Court's subsequent deci-
sion to read an implied no-strike clause into collective bargaining agreements with broad arbitration
provisions. Wellington singled out the Court's decision in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962), as proof of the Court's institutional incompetence. See H. WELLINGTON, supra
note 74, at 112-20. In Lucas Flour, the Court held that language broadly requiring the submission of
any dispute to binding arbitration gave rise to an implied promise on the part of the union to refrain
from striking over arbitrable disputes. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 105. Wellington called for the
overruling of Lucas Flour on the ground that the decision interfered with freedom of contract by
judicially prohibiting strikes over arbitrable grievances. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 74, at 119,
122. By drafting language that explicitly contemplates the exercise of economic force to resolve
workplace grievances, the parties can avoid the implication of a no-strike clause. Cf Groves v. Ring
Screw Works, 111 S. Ct. 498, 502-03 (1990) (although the Taft-Hartley Act does not favor such an
agreement, "the parties may expressly agree to resort to economic warfare rather than to mediation,
arbitration, or judicial review" to settle grievance disputes). In sum, Lucas Flour and other decisions
that interpret collective agreements under section 301 may simply provide the "contractual gap
fillers of 'off-the-rack' terms" that apply in the absence of clear statement to the contrary. See D.
LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY 369 (2d ed. 1984). Under
familiar law-and-economics principles, such terms have no distributive effect in cases where the par-
ties have good information and face low transaction costs. Id. at 371.
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thorized with the passage of section 301 thus differs markedly from the
power the federal courts had previously exercised in regulating industrial
conflicts through the labor injunction. Rather than authorizing the fed-
eral courts to make essentially ad hoc determinations about the wisdom
or necessity of particular union self-help measures that Frankfurter at-
tacked so effectively in his work on the labor injunction cases,291 section
301 called for the enforcement of contracts. Congress assumed that the
parties themselves would negotiate the standards by which their conduct
was governed292 and that the federal courts would simply enforce com-
pliance with such standards. While congressional leaders may have un-
derstated its significance, the federal common law they authorized in
1947 was different in kind from that which had rightly earned Frank-
furter's earlier condemnation.
In sum, although labor law scholars have correctly found much to crit-
icize in Lincoln Mills, they have largely ignored the fact that the lan-
guage, structure, and history of section 301 provide strong support for
Justice Douglas's principal conclusions. They have done so, it appears,
both because they shared Justice Frankfurter's deeply held but debatable
view that federal courts should attempt to avoid any entanglement with
labor contract enforcement and because they wrongly assumed that
Frankfurter had fairly parsed the legislative record. In this Article, I
have reviewed the materials that Douglas and Frankfurter considered in
their interpretation of section 301 and I have concluded that Frank-
furter's was much the more strained reading of the statute. I have also
concluded that, like much conventional wisdom, the attack on Lincoln
Mills as a lawless assertion of judicial power cannot be sustained.
291. See supra note 91.
292. In passing section 301, Congress was chiefly concerned with compelling unions to honor
their no-strike promises. See supra note 67. But Congress recognized that no-strike pledges would
remain a matter for negotiation between the parties. Id.
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